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The pur po$ e of this

is to i nvesti gat e the

de gree of infl uence whi ch Amerioa.n business
Chi na ex erted

u.pon United

th e period 1937-1938.

without

a prior

tm:1ard Japan durin g

p olicy

On the ni ght of July 7, 19;7,

mi lit ary f0rees

Japanese

States

i nte re sts in

invaded

declaration

the Republi c of China

of war,

Durin g the :months of

unde cla red but unrestrain

ed war- which followed,

investments

and industry

in the trade

threatened

with extine .tion.

widespread,
virtual

standstill;

commercial

within

China was brou ght to a

suff ered extensive

Government, moreover,

to forc .e the withdrawa l of all
fro m those

beca me more

and propertie1B owned by for ei gn

gr oups fre quently

The Japanese

of China wer e

As hos tilities

busines s acti-vity

foreign

made deliberate

efforts

f orei gn ind ust ry and trade

areas of China under its

American busine ss interests
Ja pan 's war of aggression

damage .

control.

in Ch i l'la conde mned

and ca lled

upo1ll.the Unit;ed States

Governme nt to defend the commerci al ri ghts whic h were guaranteed

by the Open noor po1iey,

Throughout

the commercial gr oup s in Chi na i nsisted

1937 and 19.38,

th at the go.ver mnent

i n Was hing ton ad opt more s pi rited

me a sures

a gainst

Japanese .

wa..s well

or gan ized

suoceeded

The busine ss c·ommunity

in kee pin g its

observations

and opin i ons

t he
an d

regarding

developments

Government
tigate
play

in China before

and the American people.

the role

the American
This

which American business

in the formulation

of U~ited

study will

interests

States

inves-

sought

policy

to

toward

Japan.
A most va luable

source

of primary

provided

by Volu me I of t he Foreign

States:

Japan,

papers

published

China Weekly Review,
lished

an English

in Shanghai,

izens

resident

the attitude

Chronicle,

a leading

the opi nion of businessmen

toward the war in East Asia.
revealed

Peace and War,

States

Hull,

foreign

study.

John

Far Eastern

Policy,

Review,

~erce

survey

sources

Record

Hill

in the

On Active . Service

Stake

valuable

in

and The

insights

wer e of special

w.

Masland's

"Commercial

n

published

in the

into

of the

nature

Pacific

and value

value

Influence

Upon

An

of American

com-

in Miriam S. Farley's

in the Far East,"

in

Hi st orical

as of pr i mary import ance.

in China was presented

"America's

States

policy.

must be rated

excellent

provided

cit-

in-

journal,

,Jose ph C. Grew's Ten Years in Japan,

Sev era l secondary
this

pub-

The Commercial

in the United

on Capitol

1'he

of American

commercial

Henrv., L. Stimson's

Memoirs of Cordell
United

newspaper

The Congressional

what was being thought

1937-193 $.

period

1943.

in

1937 and 193$.

i n China during

and Financial

dicated

reflected

of diplomatic

of State

language

was

of the United

Relations

1931-1941, a compi l ation
by the Depar tment

materials

which appea red in Far

Easter~

Survey in 1936.

were A. Whitney
.States,

Unit~d

Other noteworthy

Griswold's

Ja pan 1·s New Ord er,

The Far Ea.s tern

c·.

William

secondary

of the

Pol;icy

Johns tone' s The United

and Rober t E . Osgo odts

Ideals

sources

States

and

and . Sel£-

In tere st in AmericQ.'s Forei gn Rela t iop.s.
The major finding
commerci a l int~re~~s
fluence

broader
Alt~ough

States

AmericE;n Go.vernment

Open Door in China during

tivated

by any intrinsic

economi c relations.
opinion

states

ef forts

thwart

desire

to preserve

The United

lly

in obst;ructing

in East Asia.

The repeated
by the

sub s equ ent

to

Japan's

It ·was to

upheld the Open Door,

desire

business

to sust ain Ameri can

community

American

is a sense in which the commercial
the

the China trade

in China ..

att em ts to influence

affect

Sino - Ameri ca n

But in 1937 American

interested

of any inherent

Al t hough the

of the

Sta te s Government and pub lic

Japan th a t the United States

commerci al interests

defense

1?37 and 1938', it, was not mo-

to cre ·ate a unew order!'

and not beeause

its

came to the

nationa l i mport ance.

men were vit

in ..

'rhis

self ...interest.

in genera l had never considered

be G>fvital

Ja pan.

in ..

and oversha dowed by the

cone~rns of American national
the

American

an ulti mat e

poli cy toward

,,ras· indirect

hcH,;ever,

study is that

ill China di.d exert

upon United

fluence,

of this

course

destruet;i.on

Ja p anese gradually

was unsucce .ssful

policy
interests

dire ctly,

the re

in China did

of Ja uane se ...Ameri can relations.

of American

lives

and pr operties

an gered the peopl e of the United

in

States .

As publi c resentment

was given incre as ed latitude

Japanese

imperialism

the violation

in its

in East Asia.

of American commercial

have an ultimate
East A.sia.

grew . the Americ·an Government

influence

efforts

to deter

It is in this
rights

upon Unit ed States

way that

in China was to
policy

in
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~HAP'l'ER I

I NTRODU
CTION Arm HIS 'l'O~ICAL BAC: GROUND

Early

Diplomatic

and Commercial Relations

Since the earliest
American merchants
with

marked the first

thirty

have carried

on commercial

ti Jne an American

Canton was t he site

American

commercial

merchants

Celestial
silks,

Wit hin

of a. gro wing community

This early

who proceeded

the m,

which were paid f or lar e;el y in

trade,

t hough small

i n volume, was of
an

small

maritime

ear ly yea r s depend ed he.avily

ei gn tr ade and shi ppin g for it s liveli
1 aul H. Clyde, The Far East:
I mpact of t h e West

of

produc t s of the ancient

import ance to a youthrul

nati on whi ch i n its

y

The ea rly China cli ppers brou ht back

s pic es, and tea,

considerable

China tra de.I

sou ght the exotic

Kin gdom.

:specie.

directl

agents.2

Like t he •uro pean traders
American

relations

shi p had sailed

of the early

the center

years,

resident

days of the America n Republic ,

The voya ge of the Empres 8 of China in 1784

China.

to Canton,

, 1784-1900

on Ea ste r n Asia

Hail, Inc., 1948), P• 127.

hood.3

upon for-

Althou gh many

A Histo:r v of the

( New York: .

Fre ntice-

2J ulien Arnold, China:
A Commercial and Industrial
Handbook, U. s. Dept. of Commer ce Tr ade Pro motion Series
No·. 28 (viashin gt on= U. S. Gov ernment
ri ntin g Office,
1926), P • 139.
i'ast,

I:

3Miriam S. Far ley,
Tra de,

rt

0

America's

St ake in the Ii'a.r

Far Ea st ern ~urveY:, V ( July 29, 1936},

162 .

2

A er fcans

interested

in th e Far Eas t ern trade

China. t o be t he . iOSt

valuable

erat i on s were based ma i n yon
opments rather

Asian .Jta:rk et , t he ir

the hop e qf futur e deve l-

trade

was to be a consta ntly

Chinese-A mer ican relation
The first

sh , th ~ir

en joy t he fi ian cial
East

India

fe lt
there

st rained

t h ei r tr.J.de

fr ee om than did the

Ameri ca n..,t bowev r,

ba cking or the presti

6

did not

e of the English
val pr otec ti on

s lon g as the earl y Arrerican

t 1at he enjoy ed equal tradin g ter ms

was little

t han its

g the me in

recurrin

Compan y , nor did they ha ve then

author i ties

af ter

rivals.

government .

of t h eir

with China ra ther

American mercha nt s con ucted

chief

This

s.

wi t h a l ar ger measur e of individual
Briti

consi d-

t han upon pr esen t a ccom li shment s.4

emphas is u· on the potential
a ct ualities

consi dered

'V ith

agit atio n f or the off icial

in \'.a.shing ton.

be t ·1een the British

tra

er

the British,

su pport

of th e

But as re l a.tions

grew more

and the Chinese

Government

1834, thi s ear ly i nd i f f eren c~ t o offi cial

supp ort

gave way .5
~

en t he Chinese

ga ve indication

in 1839 _tha t t hey

would work to li mit th e vol ume of forei gn trade
then t he only Ch i nese port
America n businessmen

at Cant on,

open to forei gn co.mnerce,

of t hat cit y petitioned

the

the Unit ed

4· 11lliam L. 1 umann, " Ambi guity and Ambivalence
Idea ls o:f · ation al Int er est i n Asia," Isolation- and
Se cur iU,
ed . Alexander
DeConde ( Dur h am, 1fort h Carolina:
5uk e Univer sit y Press , 1957), p . 151.
5c1yde, p . 127.

in

3
States

to send a commerci a l a gent who ~-.ras

Congress

autho_ized
they

to conclude

re'"'uested,

a tre aty of commerce.

a naval

ad e uate

force

· It ·was du.ring

citi .ze ns and pro p erty,

th e American

however, the f irst

prove fatal

Govern ment i"elt constrained

of a series

to China's

sove rei

occ asi on for t he first
po,er

was the illegal

Britain

had 'been enga ging in..
tra. e in the years
serious

increased

Vcstly

nation's
tail

for

i mportation

tra~e

to export

Opium War

and the Chi nese :Gmp
ire

already

enervate
the

Chi na was forced
da y s o:f Chi na 's

end.

The next

silver

"'-rowth of

to hostilities
To r a.y f or t h is

China..

The efforts

Britain

before

prior

:reat

1

Gov...

much to the
of China to -cur-

pr ovi ed the cause f or war.7

r.rhe so-called

less

bet"7een China and a

in opium the Chinese

eco n omic detri ment.

this

The

'I'he unprecedented

c onsec-1uences

to

,;ere to

traf f ic in opium whi ch

i mraediately

erl"u"nent had been forced

of wars which

nty t ook place.

a:rmed clash

western

produced

o:f.' the

"ar ,.;'Way Ganton. 6

commerc e at

Before

this

of wors-

t hi s pe riod

Govern ment and American citi zen s was turned unon

the .em.bryonic

act,

to ~-rote ct Ameri c an

t hat the att,ention

enin g An· lo ..Chin ese relat'.ions

American

Furthermore,

ended disrstrously

for the

Kin gd om of the f,ianchus •

Celestial

s uper ior

( 1839.-1 LJ
.2) b - t we ,.n Ore" t

stren gth of a tfba:r ,a roustt

to sue r or peace wi th Great Britai
exclus i veness

hundred. years

and su p eriority

Help ..

na~ion,

n.

The

were · at an

wo 1·1d see in c.r.aas i n.gl y

4
vora ·cious

:foreign

di ct ate th e terms

intruders

under which

China mi ght enjoy tr r de and pea ce-. 8

The Treaty
t he Opium :Jar,

of fank i g (1842} whi ch officially

an

a sup plementary

1'1ter,

set th~ basic

China's

international

forced

to open ne

uniforn

China's

a year

""or a ce ntury . n9

t o forei gn comrnerce,

tariff,

in cri minal

China was
agreed

provt d ed fo r extraterritorial

cases--a

f or Brita in.

seri01.1s infrin

if t he Chinese

This latt er provision

Emperor

pr ivile ge s or immunities
s ame :i.mmu.ni ties

gement upon

subsequently

gua ranteed

granted

additional

to ot h er f orej_g11 countries,

and pri vile

enjoyed by British

es would be extendec

subjects.lo

Bri t ain had wrung th e most -f av orec-uation
overi-t elmecl IV'
anchus,

time ha

come to

Ameri can trade.

the

United

ive serious

to seek t he most-fav

8Jbid.,

11Ibid.,

agreement

p.

the

124.

P• 129.

9Ibid.,

the

of

It was to safe ...

and commerce tha t Pre sident

i nt r ep i d d:lpl ()mat Caleb

ored ...n.s.tion

from

to the future

and commerce in Chi na .• ll

authorized

Great

St ate s fel t that

attention

g ard the futu re of th1.s trade
J'ohn Tyler

the

to c;i.
nd

When the American Government learned _ that

the

to a

soverei gnty- ...and se cured the most ...favored-nation

treatment
that

ports

-~nd mod0rate

juris di ction

s igned

pr i nci ples whiehwer e nto gov ern
status

I

treaty

ended

tre atment

P • 125.

for

Cushing

Ameri can

5
busi n ess men .12
Cushi n
the instructio
States

was emin ent l y success f ul i 1 carr yin g out
ns of his sup erior.

conclu ded its

Congress

I n 1844, the United

firs t t rea t y with

and th e Amerj.ca.n pu blic

!e kin g .

P.:
ave h earty

Both

a pproval

the commerci ~l tre aty which Cushi ng ha d concluded,

o ium.

t

nlJ

merc hants

foythe

'fhe mo t- fa vored-n

~an ghia "expressed
Ameri cans that

it

so exactly

in place

Chines~l

"";ion tre~.t ment

,rhi ch Gush ing had obt a ined

af ter

princi ple of America's

aga inst

F'ro m t his

in China was to

atmos phere whi ch existed

policy.15
in China

for a new war

the Manc hus was not lo ng in pr e sentin g itself

Pur ported
French

of

Far Ea tern

of Nanki ng , the occasion

the Treaty

f or American

t he r eal inter es ts of

sur vived f or a ce ntury. nl4

In the strained

of

in th e Treaty

ti me for war d , e ual commerc i al opportu..~ity
be t he cardinal.

f or as

how much of our

one Congres sman obser ved, no one knew " ' just
t obacc o mi ght be chewed

i n sults

Cat h olic

armed action.«16

to t h e Britis
priest

.

h Crown a nd t h e ,ur der of a

,,vere t h e "conve n ient

The ensuin g conflict

prete xt s for

was brief

12 J ohn \v. ia sl and, "Commercial In f luence
Policy,
1937-1941, 1' The Pa ci fic Historical

~.astern
XI (Se ptember,

to

and

Upon Far ·
Review,

1942},. p . 2$1.

lJClyde, p. 131.
14Ibid., p . 129.
1 5A. Whitney Griswold, 7;he Far Easte!n Policy of the
Brace & Co., I 938), p. b.
United S:t~tes ( !fe1,,r Ycr-k: Harcourt,

-------

16c1yde,

p . 152.

6

decisive.

In the tr aties

of Tientsin

(185S),

tte

Government was compelled to accede

to an expansion

principles

in the treatie

and practices

set forth

Chinese
of the

s of 1842

and 1844.
Chine. was now fully
com,11erce,

the fifty

During

settlements

at Tientsin,

whieh reduced

its

inroads

opened to the
yea .rs which

China _was su b jected

soverei gnty to a fiction

And when that

was well
for

be turned

inward

the

from the

rapidly

during

rising
Civil

of the nineteenth

upon self-development

Althou gh exports

of Wanghia,

tha.t

lay

r ather

beyond

United States
the fifteen

from $2,276,000

1860,

the

years

or so were to see exports

War was to bring

the

American
the United

century
than

broad

yea .rs after

upon

Pa ci fi c.

the 'Treaty

a change.

'l'he next

fal l and a gen eral
Absorption

capacity

in the develo pment of the American
t l1is decline.1

·would

in 1845 to $8>906,00O in

of the China trade.

for

l nation.

to China had

guishing

pr i mary reason

A civil

war had come and passed,

:remainder

commerci al pros pects

increased

But at this

on t he ·way to beco ming an i ndustria

At·tention

the

to polic ies

.17

war was about to break upon the badly divided

States

the treaty

followed

eyes of America i.·:ere not upon China.

moment, the

.. epublic.

of foreign

thirty

lan ...

of productive
'iest was th e

8

1 7f arold s. Qui gley, Far Ea.ste rn ilar
(Boston:
World Peace Foundations,
1942, p ,

18 charles s. Campbell, Jr., Speciq]_ Business
Interests
a.nd the Open Door f>oliey (New Haven:
Yale
University
Pr~s , 1951}, p . 10.

7
The outco me of t his pro cess of internal
was the transformation
industrial

America was already

ent ring into that

'It.hich was to g ive birth.

forei gn markets . 19

pha ...
-,c of mass

to a rene1.-fed in terest

which had lain

previous

three

decades.

Between 1890

from the

United

St tes

to China increased

23,745,000.

total

Durin g this

exports

in 1e90 to

to all

and risen

parts

t h e fact

sta nant for the

f ro m

rose

that

and exports

little

.from ~~857, .502,548

the China tra.de had recov0re<l

attention

to 1900, the

of the United St ates with

The American -in ustrial

a -\,':hole paid

America's

in 1900. 20

China amounted to only 2 pe r cent of' total
trade .

v?,385,362

hm ever,

sa me period,

to new neigh ts in the decade prior

combined imports

in

nd 1900, exports

of the world

1,47 8 ,050,000

Des)ite

century,

to China shared in the gene ral

Exports

expansi .on of f orei gn trade

to

i nto a great

By the end of the nineteenth

nation.

produ ction

of the United States

development

American forei

and financial
to tne

n

comm.unity as

Chi nes e market.

Althou gh some bu '.lness grou ps expressed _ considera ble interest
in the potential
re mained that
icant

of the China trade,

the "'undamental fact

"China was a remote and relatively

province

of American

Other forces

insignif--

-economic ent er p:rise.u21

wer e afoot,

ho ~ ,ver,

w·hich ·were to

19F rley, Far Easter n Sur vey. V (Ju ly 29, 1936 ),1 62.
20campbell, p . 10.
21 Gri

SlJ

old,

n . 24 .

8

su pport the speculations

envisioned.

a bri ght future

.

As a result
increasin

of those

business

Those business

St ates whic h constantly

small but vocal

the nation

i mportant

circles

prosperity

annexation

of the Phi li ppine s and the desire

· ·d 25
perio.

ado ption
President

tiable
to tear

Both the desire

of the expans ionist
this

a cl imat e of opinion

of the Open Door Policy

.for the

f or a r or e

impulse

grou p was sma.llt

in China

of th e
can be credited

it

favorable

to the

by the administr a tion

of

1>1
cKinley. 26

Ntlliam

'fhe Doctrine

China's

for the

of American ri ghts and interests

Although

with producing

territorial

combined with the

of th~ Philip pines.24

were co- products

States

in the United

cli qu e to press

expansionist

defense

became

The United

annexation

spirited

in China •

stres s ed the value of the China

continued

marke t to America's

1

of the Far East . 2 2

emer ged from the war as a power having
in Asia.23

which

for American -enterprise

of the Spanis h - American War

gly conscious

interests

interests

of the

Ope:n Door

In the last

two dec ades of the nine tee nth century,

hun'ili ation

had been made complete

hung er of the Western

as the insa-

powers f or empire

away are as over whi ch China exercised

In 1ag4, France

seized
'

22c ampb el.,J
23Far ley,

I ndochina.

_suzerainty

.

Two years

p . 41 ,
Far Easte rn Survex,

1
24Masland,
rhe Pa cific
(September,
1942), 82.

25 Griswold,

drove them

p . 26.

V (July

His torical

2:6ca mpbell,

29• 1936), 162.

Review,

P • 1.
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9

later,

Burm.a "icls absorbed

its

1

forced

of Korean

re.c c)gn iti,on

an d, to make Pe kin gt s sham e eomplet~,

lar ge ca sh i de mnity.
dealt

h Errrp
ire.

Britis

a war i n H~94, ·.rhich ended ~ i th Ch i na 's

provoked

Formosa

int ·o the

·with

the
1

tttreaties,n

·, ·.enever

ore harshly,

'le

Japan

loss

of

rindependence,

1

t he imposition

China resisted,

o·f a

was

it

t,o si n nore

comp elled

and pay

se" mor e t erritory,

tt

ore

"ind.em ...

nities.t,27
By 1S97 1 t h e

oment

se . nted. very near

annexa tion

Powers trmuld be .gin the

actual

res pe ctive

"nf'luence ."

ns phe r e s of

w1ten ·the Great

of t he ir

balan ce of

'l"he de licate

power a1ong t he Gre at Po1ers .in China see med on the ver e
of coll apse,

and i n all

pro bab ilit y the .extinction

Chinese independen ce would . f ollo w.2S
nial

position

treaty

ri ,hts

deel i ning Manc hu s.

sive

·of these

privile

that

year period

igation,

of

sy5tem.

Th e United

was the

ges , but there

were al s o t ariff

States

and river

had sha red in t his

li mited

exten•

nav-

27For man Harrison,
Changing
19L}8 ), P • 44•

com...l ex of

China's

But wher eas the European states

freed om

had carved

Ch i na Ofow York:

Pub liti h in g Co.,

p .. 25.

. ost

and of es t ablishin g a postal

which so dra stically

2Scampbell,

but als o

Extr at .er r itoriality

ar riso ni ng troops,

of a.ction.29

whi ch the

,;rung from the

had been

re str i cti ons , am:1 t h e ri ght s of coastal

prero ga tives

qua si-colo-

resul t d not only fr .om t he spheres

owers had carved out over a fj_fty
f ro m the

China's

of

29Quigley,

·

PP• 34-35.

Crown

10
t heir

initials

upon China by

of i:i;iflue nce, th

ar kin g of f spe cial

Unite d ...,tatcs had denied

0

en cl av es

it s elf t his type

of concession.30
By 1$9$ , the n 1 all
Ea.stera

the salien t fea tures

of th e Far

pol icy of t he United St ate s had virtually
of commercial

=quality

op~or tunity,

's obje ctive.,

sitio n , was Americ

j elled.

not territorial
amity,

Pc~ace,

cquiand trad e

form ed the bed -roc k of United State s • pol i cy to ward Cb.ina,31

But a ha l f -c entury
terrj.tories

of gradu 1 en croac hments upon Ghina 's
to ter min ate in a f lurry

was a pp arent ly about

of land - r bbin

whi ch would s pell

r i tori al i ntegrity
merc hants

an d

.

an end to Chi na' s ter -

Thes e devel opments alarmed American

issio :riaries

they would be eliminated

al i k e, bot h

fr om t he

0

roups

fea ri ng t.hat

lo riou s futur e in China

whi ch both env isioned.

Appea ls were made tote

Departmen t to intervene

i n the cours e of even ts.

British,

who had a much vaster

tr ade and f in::incial

the Chinese Empir e , added t he ir exhort ation$
mor.32

States,

throughou t all

The

stake

to th e cl.a-

w ic h had consid-

Thus it was th at Grea t Brit a in,

era ble .int erests

State

of Asi a , an d the United

whic h h1·d 1eg l igab le interests

but " garg antuan

exnect
atio ns ' li found re aso n to make common cause aga inst
~
30Gris old,

P• 6.

J 2Thomas A. Baile y , Th,e. an in'- the
York :

The

~a cmillan

Co.,

194 8 }, P • 28 0 .

...,tr eet

( New

in

11

further

infri ng .ments u_ on China's
Secretary

o·f . State

colla borat io n 1,tith

the

John Hay,

British,

worki n 0 in close

p enned the

first

In these

notes,

in 1899.

fa n ous Open Door notes

t a.tter .ed sovereignty.33

the powers to acc ep t th e ide al ;f c~mmercial
Althou gh most of the

China.

princ i ple of co. ITTJ.e
rcial

ific ations,

repli

Hay urg ed

equality

Gre a,t Powers a ccepted

e uality

Hay publicly

of th e

only ·with

in

th

extensive

qua l-

an nounced th at he had received

s fro m the powers whi ch were "fi nal and definitive.tr

~hen the Boxer Rebel lion

flared

Hay announced--U

lat;er

in 1900,

notes

to the other

is time witho ut benefit

of

pow rs--t ha t the Open Door h d be en

extend ed ,to include

t he ter r itorial

well as equality

of commercial

Chine s e Empire.

11

events,

up in China only months

integrity

opp ortunity

Thus, on the rushing

of China,

within

tide

as

the

of dramatic

the ne-w Open Door was floa ted be.fore the public

gaze.« 34
'rhe popu lar
effected

the rescue

appea red certai n.

ef f orts

pe rsists

among the

that

pe n ha.d

Hayts

of China at a t i me when its

Such was hardly

China was to a large
ri valr ies

notion

enouement

the cas e, however.

egree the benefici ar y o:f the gro wing
Great

O:ters of

,urope •

In tl-i.eir

to make certai n t ha t none C-.)
ained any undue

33 ob rt B. Osgood, Ideals

Amer ic a 's

Eoreign

Chica go Pr ess,

Rela.ti.ons

and Self-I nterest

in

_{....
O'""
·h...i.....
c_a
_g_
o_:_....,,
,r=li
-e-....,u,...
n-i~'v-e--r· -s..-it-y-of

1953}~ p . 61.

34Baile y , pp , 2$6-87 s

i2
advanta ge, they effectiv
pursuing

their

ely prev ented each other
l asJirations

te rr itoria

d octr itre -i.··as no more effective
Britain

States

a nd t h e United

than

from

in China .35
the

power of Gre a t

;:,-tates t o ba ck it

up , and the Uni ted

di d not hav e the armed str ength to rescue

Hay' s bl uff

boen ch a l lenged .

Hay nor any other

American

if ca lled

en forcin g it

should

'n e ithe r

1

had any intention

of

.

until

The United

to rush to China' s defense

As lon g as t he United States

ment th at the

Ameri c an po licy

the territ

ori al in te grity

detachment

in the fu ture

States

was

if anoth er

policy,

this

of s er ious i nvolvement

of Ea st ern As ia .

was

t r ea t ened to di~membe r it.

pursued

entan gl ements

1900 ,

i nt egrity

Chlna r s terr i torhll

p ower or c o ,binati -on of powers

able to remain free

of fac t,

b e note -d that

merely a self -i mpos e~ re gulation
under no obl i fl"ation

Chi na ha d

to bo ok-"36

Furt hermor e:, it

America' s res pe ct. for

In point

of ficial

The

.But rith
of the

of China,

it was

in the politi

Hay's

pronounce-

Open Door no\": includod

su ch a de gree of

·would be virtually

i mpossible .3 7

The Open Door an d Sin o- American

Economic Rel at io ns, 1900~1931
Threats

to China 's territorial

integrity

an d

America 's commerce,

however, were not to cease at the

flourish

Theodore Roos eve lt's

of

35

&

Ihid.,

pe n.

p . 287 .

37Griswold,

P-•

7,

cal

f ir st i mpulse

36osgood, P• 62.
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durin g t h e Russ o-Ja panese War of 1904-1905 had been to
favor

Japan so that

Rus si a's

hold on 1~1
an churia

wea kened and the Open Door thereby
ef f orts
i

to restrict

American

,an chur i a had been analyeed

cz arist

government's

The treaty

desire

of President

binding

and

Japan

measures

ussia

common to a ll

enterpri

all

contained

ttnot to obstruct

countries,

William

·ms made manifest

but ill-conceive

d attem pt to

ipate

g upon the

any ~eneral

which China may take for
of r"'ianehuria.

inept

attempts

by

Knox, to interest
tear

the

contro1.40

erst 1h ile

1• nchurian

ecretary

several

to build

the Hukuang
by the

Russia

even more

of State , Philander

powers in a fin an cial

proved

by

to partic-

r ail ways away from Russian

Both ef f orts
ene mies,

in China was an aggressive

had been s ucceeded

his

u39

of Dollar

ri ::·ht of Americ a n int erests

His efforts

under

ro mote Americ a n ca pital

in a t hree- power consortium

r ai l 111
ay.

China.

a provision

Howard 'l'aft' s policy

Diplomacy as it

insistin

of t he

Horth

the develo pment of the commerce and industry
President

se in

whi ch had been concluded
. oosev elt,

be

Russia 's

one expre ssion

to dominate

of pea ce its elf,

the mediation

protectect.38

commercial
a,·~ but

might

unsuccessful,

G.

sc _ eme to
and Japanese

wit h t he

and Ja pan, coo perating

to defea t

39T. A. Biss on , American Poli ex in the J:l"a
r East,
of Pa cific Rel a tio n s,
19;1-1940 (New York: Institute
1940), p . 9.
40 os good, p . 103.
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this

t o international:J.ze

plan

the

1

an churian

railway

sys-

~

s

tem. 41
four

Durin g t he first

admi nis trati

on , Taft's

w s discontinu

ed .Li-2 i ilson

championed be halted

ever,

·Tilso n de pa rted

Robert

of "the

s harply

.d that

that

in Jo inin g in the

crea .tion

broa der membership
ci te China's

the

by the

for .-the

interested

proposal

came to noth~ng .44

and

ba s ed upon a

in attitude

Open Door

1hich

in the new co nsortium

'

participation

had

4-lnu i g le y, p . 37.

ll-2Bailey,

43Quigley,

44:tbid.,

-

and the

to i mple m(!mt the

g American influence
in lar ge loans

and by encouraging

p . 37,,

of

The Chines e Gover nment,

poli cy of the Open Door by interjeetin

Chinese Government,

Secretary

would not depre-

shift

and 1/Jilson had attempted

in the form of private

of al0 -o.fness

Governm.ent' s reckless

banks .

was not

Both Taft

that

This abrupt

ho·wevar,

it

Stat es was .interested

of a new co.ns ortium

Chinese

from Japanese

had

In 1917, h ow...

to Ameri c an bankers

United

grew· out of new ap prehension
been eng endered

-1 43

in China.

and upon conditions

sovereignty.

financial

controls

.from hi s po licy

_Lansin g ga ve notice

the

administration

stringent

pr ojects

ilson'

Di,plomacy in China

Admi11istration.f

financial

forei gn governments

borrowing

of Dollar

had insiste

because

over t he Chinese

to international
State

• olicy

of :,'oodrow

in China which the p rec .eeding

a dventures

involved

years

direct
p . 240 •
p . 39.

.

to the

inv e stments

15
by Amertcan buc;inessmen.,
in thej_r

1 ar

efforts

B, th pre side nts ha..- been t hwarted
b cau ,-e of t he apat hy of Ameri can

ely

inv est ors for such pro,j ec·ts,

an indifferc.:i:nce whic h was

ba sed pa rtl y u on the

1 no wleJ .ge of the

exte ns ive

invest-

ments by other

already

in · hina

and pa rtly

u on the

traditi

These obst a cles
position

this

sta tes

~laced

the Department

to must er k-'ublic

of St ate in t he
opi nion in sup port

into world affairs.45

ne w departure

l ar gely turned

against

Dollar

Invest ments i n. Cnina re mained small
the United

St ate s was forced

more li mited

objective

1

of forei gn entang le ments .• "

on of "av0idance

of having

however,

existing

opinion,

Di plo macy.46
urin g this

to content

of merely

Public

of

acting

itself

period,

and

wit h the

as a brake upon the

more ag gr essi ·ve powers.A,?
few commerci a l groups

Although
believed

i n the

and facilities

Far Eastern
twentieth
that

of' t he China

id not f a :i.l to provide

Government

commercial

viability

in ·the United
, e.rket,

the

the necessary

Stat es

Amer_ican

ag encies

for t he pro moti on of Chinese-A mer:lcan

r elatio ns .

affairs

Di plo matic

during

of f icials

the firs t se ve ral

concern ed with
decades

of the

ce nt ury w re moti v:::1ted by the basi c assu mption

China wold
4.5Ib id.,

one day be a great

market

ca pable of

p . 36.

4 6 samuel 1''lag g Bemis, The Un ited States
as a World
Power:
A
Di:olomatic
Histor
190C3-I
5
{New
York:
· Henry
.;;.,,.;:;~;,;;;:..,;:__,,,..;;,;..~~;;;..;;,;:~;:;.=.~'""'"r'~...;:;.
........._,_.::;.._......,. ................
olt & Co., 1955, P• 1.

47Qui gle y , p . 36.
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absorbing

vast amount s of American products.48

of f icials

wrote

co t · er c i al

pamphlet s givin g details

life . in Ch i na , invariably

opp ortun i t ie s for
fa ci lities

e to Americans

cally

po i nti ng out the

resident

tive

The commerci alized

from the Unit ed States.

pro motio na l or ga nizations

g t he

for t h e sele cti on

in Chi na . 49

co astal

of most of the markets

rtvast

in China , and

su gg estin g a criteria

of the busin es s r epresent

site

on every phase of

ind us tri a l development , tt outlinin

availabl

even optimisti

Government

re g ion of Ch ina

v;as t h e

for manufa ct ured goods co min g

50

It v.·as in t his area

and a ctivities

t

that

trade

ere con ce ntrated.

A re present at i ve of the D~part ment of Commerce was sent
t he ancient

ca pital

city

of Peki ng i n 1914 .

Chambers of Commerce wer e functioning
Shan gh ai , Tientsin

to

Americ an

vi gorously

at

, Hankow, and Peking by the ear ly 1920's,

By 1925, Americ an tr ade commissioners

located

in Shangh ai

an d Cant on wer e com il in g a mont hly res ume of th e Chlna
tra de for general

distri

bu tion

a mong all

Americans

des ir ing

suc h infor mati on . 51

48r~Ias land,
( Sept ember,

1942);

The Pa ci fi c Historical
2 93.

n ev ie w, XI

49see Julean Arnol d Ch ina 'rr ade B~ac t s, U, S . Dept .
of Commerce, Bureau of Forei 1gn and Dome sti c Commer c·e
0 as h in ,t on: U. S . Government Pri nting Off ice • 192 5}.

United Stat es Trad e and t h e
Sino-Ja pan ese War,"' Far Easte r n Survex, VII (Ja nuary 5,
1938) , 2.
51Arnold , p . 12.
50~'falter

A. Radiu s,

11
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Official

encoura gement,

stimulate

greater

main land.

While

very

rapidly

after

of missionary,
invested

American business
total

$16,000,000,000

1914--from

medical,

were

nan ci a l interests
great

o.f all

In comparative

Ariteriean,53

contrast,

By

in 1931.

British

holding s constitut

business

i nves tments

Britis

h fi-

About four ...fifths
in bua.iness

tebacco

small factories.

of' all

bankst

stations,

oil

The$e direct

business

American concerns totaled

52Qui gley,

'' William

while

American

concerns:.

·of all

one

Th e Ja panese

Russian in-

with 11 per cent.54

companies,

80 per eent

as

ed 39 p er eent

in China.

were a poo-rthird

or about

ruean ·s that

Totalin g nearly

vestments

private

this

was in

invest ments in China as of 1930; only

·with 37 per eent of the tot-al,

shipping,

total

terms,

were next

China were

was

enterprises)

in China were six and on-e- ha lf times

dollars,
foreign

$200,oootooo(excl usive

than

and educational

-as -American holdings

billion

rose

t ,o more than

Only ,ii>
40,000 _1 000 of this

the foreign

6.1 pe r cent

abroad

$2,500,000,000

in 1930--less

in China .

on the China

activity

American investments

t h e form of loans. 52

of all

however a was not enough tel

p1.1b
lic

utilities.,

newspapers,

investments

approximately

American

in

investments

commerc.ial

and

by

$160,000 1 000
int ,erests

p •. 40.

w.

Lockwood Jr.,

Far East, ,· II: · Investments,"
12, 19361, P~ 181,

54"'i:
(\.ui g 1 ey,
P• 41
-•

«America's

Far Ea!:?tern Survey,

Stake in the
V (August

1,

in Chi na. 55 The remainin g 20 per cent,
was in portfolio
portfolio

investments.

investments

or about ,~
, 4-0,000 ., 000,

This same r atio

held true

of direct

to

for a11 forei gn investors

in China in 1930.56
On the

eve of Ja pan's

American concerns
Doth invest ments
point

made two major
were located

of Ameri can co mer cial

two lar g e Ameri ca n utility

of Ivan churia

invasion

in~est ments

in Shan gh ai,
activity

companies

in China .

long the fo cal

in China .
ac quir·ed

a controlling

ga ve the company a monopoly in supplyin g ele ctric
et t leme nt at Shan ghai.

the

International

the

American-m ·med International

purchased

pany , a tr an saction

the

foreign

substantially
tionally

Shan gh ai Mutual

in Shangha.;i..

in East

-- ------------------55
p. l"O.

56t• ei Ying -lin,

China

to the

These two transactions
in the

interna -

of Japan and the

Ja pa n had emerged as the chief

178.

su pplied

a dom-

city~57

. Uni ted St ates

uigley,

later,

Tele phone Com-

increa s ed t he American stake

The Rivalry

Ch ina:

One year

·which eave the Americ n concern

community

controlled

power to

'l'elep hone and Telegraph

inai;it intere st in the tele ph one service
large

In 1929,

Power Company under terms which

intere st in the Shanghai

Cor por ation

in 19.31,

Institute

Asia
challeng er of the

--------

China nnd f orei gn Capi tal ( Chun gking,
of Paci fic Relatio ns, 1945), p . 43.

57Lockwood, E.~r Easte rn Surv ey, V (August

12, 1936),
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Open Door in C!dna fro i t he early
century.
1904,

regarded

eopl e lad

favored

as . a civil izing

barbari c a.nd a threat

1fir •.

commerci al intere

Rooseve lt

substitution

of Japan

the Far East , Roosevelt

soon reali

0

i ed,

ts sith ow-

gr was

lon g-ran ge inter-sts
anx i ous to restrain

as he had been to ch eck the advances

ti me on , relations
i.1m
r sen ed.

steadj_ly

a. barrier

increasingly

and

for Russ ia in t an ch ur ia. 59 _·. ;

From the sta ndp oi nt of IL~erica's

St a tes

who were

Open Door- po li .cy ha d not been st.rEmgthened

t hat the

From t h is

Ja pan ese,

who were looked upon a s r:,;emi
...

to American

mated in Ma.nchuria . 58

by the

the

fo rce at work i n the Far Eas t,

had opposed the Rus sians,

ever,

and t,he gr e at mas$ of

Theo dore Roosev elt

the Arneric an

of the twentieth

of the HUsso - Ja.panese va:r in

At t he outb r eal

President

cays

of the Russian

bet.ween Ja pan

£\U'

in
Ja an
bear. 60

t he Unit~d

'rh e Oryen Door pol t cy beGame

to Ja panese advances

on the . Asian

conti nen t• 61

Joto

ly did Japan come to re sent America's

posi tio n i n Ch:l.na ~nd ·the l<ar East. as a whole , but i t also
became co nvin ced tha t all

pote nt ial

threat

forei··n

to the continued

inv~stors

in China were a

economic pr ospe rity

of'

58osgood, p . 67.
59sa muel Fl agg Bemis, American ·Fore i i:rn Policy and
Henry Holt & Go., 1959) , p. 357.

Di2lo macy (New York:
60osgood,

61Bemis,

p . 67.

American Fore i gn Policy,

P• 356.

the

Japanese

Empire .

durin g the last

three

As Japan

decades

had ado pted the techniques
beco me increasin

. 62

Asian

mainland

the

presen .ce of other

own vital

century

of mass product.ion , it

had

to .fi n d comm.odity

~1erefore
had 1.,

Japan
powers

in China

outlet~

ed

and

on

co me to re gard

as inimical

to i.ts

interests.-

World War!,

During
challenge

Japan

ma.de its

to th e Open Door when it

Twenty ...One Demands against
far--reaching
had been

China.

in character

compelled

become .a. virtual

that

first

serious

lod ged t h e no·torious

These exactions

wer e so

if the young Chinese Republic

to a cce pt them .io. tot o, Ch ina would have

Japanese

prote ctorat e. 63

Here aga i n, how...

the Open Door poli cy was used to block Japan's

ever,

ambitious
as the

efforts

content

Seqretary

to gain suzerainty

of the

of State

disp~tched
that

of the nineteenth

gly pressed

the

had grm •m more 5.ndustrializ

Jennings

Bryan,

on Murch 13 , 1915, informed

in a note

both China and Japan

Gover nment would not reco gnize any

or undertaking

which would i mpair

ri ghts of t h e United States
political

As soon

rrwenty - One Demands w1a.smade -publ ic,

William

the Unite d States

a greem~nt

over China.

or territorial

an d its

integrity

China , or t he international

citizens

''the

treaty

in China,

of the- Republic

pol i cy relative

the

of

to China

62charles A. Beard, American Forei n Poli GMaking, 19,3:?
- 1940 (New Haven :
p . 112 .

6 3Ben~is , Th~ United

States

as a World

Power , p •. 210.
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com.m
only _ knoi n as t he Open Door polic y .» 64
labors

of American di plomacy, moreover,

The subsequent

succeeded

persuad i ng Japan to withdraw

those demands whi c

been fatal

•nty.

States

to Chinese

soverei

in
would have

Although the United

could not ...re vent Chi n 's aceept-an ce of the remaining

demands, the Ameri c'"'n Government had once again bl ocked
Japan 's prin ci pa l nation~l
China. 6;

Dec;p ite

obje ctive:

se t back on the Asian

this

em~r g ed from the Fi r st vrorld
and ·urestige"

that

to i,-ain

could

Jap n's

increa""i ng rivalry

0

United St<:'tes and Japan in the Far East
1ashin gton Naval Conference

'l.'he agree ments reached
1922, ended the

eriod

ad emer ged as a by- product
three

princi

al treaties

re pr ·EfGented an effort
and ·the
between

estern

and Italy,

declared

no nel'.l capital

64B·isson,

p.

Haslingt◊n

of crisis

to the

in early

The Five

Power r aval

between

Ja.p.an

Treaty

Ja p n, Fran ce,

naval holiday"

were to be bui lt,

The

from the conference

Great Britain,
11

Feb-

in Eas t As:i.a wh:i.ch

a com:: ro mise

during which

an d imposed

a ratio

12 •

6 5Bemis, The United States

s a World Power,

66Ber.us,
. . AmerJ.can
.
For ei~n ~olicy,

6 7Bisson,

between the

of the war in Euro pe.,67

a te n year

ships

at

to strike

t1e United States,

new

led shortly

whi ch resulted

powers.

in po,ter

of 1921-1922. 66

·1

ruary,

over

inl and , (Jap n

Wa r nwit,h an eau&lity

not be denied.

posit ion of stren gt h and th

nk

astery

p . 13.

p . 456.

p , 210.
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of 5-5-3-1 . 75-1. 75, res pectiv ely,

ship tonnage.68

on ca pital

The ter ms of t he Four Power Tr eaty con stituted

pled ge bet rnen the three

lateral

France re g··.r di ng the insul
The f our st ates

each other's

ri ghts

in

in the Pa ci f ic re gi on a nd to consult

or should be thr ea tened

by an outside

t h e Ni ne Po 'ler Tr ea ty,

of controversy

power.

A t hird a"'reeQ

e1 bodied the most

swee ping

of th e America n pr inci ple of the Open Door ever

af f irmation

the na tio n s a sse mbl ed at

All

China , a s well

as hin gton a gre ed to

al an d administrative

re sp ect the territori

China . 69

owers and

in the Paci fi c.

if those ri ghts beca me the subject

to gether

made.

naval

r possessions

agreed to re spect

ins ul ar possessions

ment,

great

a multi ...

a s e !uality

The s pecial

of commerci al oppor tunity

treaty

wrun g f'ro m Ch lna in years

inte grity

privile

of
within

ges ~ hich had been

past were not touched

b y t his

pact , however .

The rras hington
to r etreat

from "active

aking the Americ an
s ' bility

of all

Power Treaty.
sole

Door.

Conf erence allow ed the United

guardian

the

di plo macy in the Far .Eastrt by

olicy

of t h e Open Door the r e spon-

owers whi ch subscribed

•rneUnited

The nav al li mit ations
made it

ernment to defend

the O en Door, 70

American

embodied wit hin the Open

i m osed by the Five Power

'l1reat y , moreov ·er,

6gos good, p . 339.

to the Nine

St ates 1"ras thus no lon ger the

of t h ose pri nci ples

70Bemis,

States

i mpoRsi ble for the American GovThis

co nd ition

69Ibid . , p . 340 .
Foreign

Policy,

P • 460.

,_
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however,

wa.s n ot substantia

lly

different

from that

exLsted pra.or to t h e Conference;

the

never

to suBta.in

been

suffi ci ent l y p m·1erful

nFrom the ti me of Hay's ori ginal
Door

olicy

Unit(jd

States
the

announcement

whi ch ha d
ha d

Open Door.

of the Open

no Ameri can states man had ever contemplated

enforcement:

the Five Power Treaty

its

i d not change th is

situation.n71
Americats
of the

frustrating

Twenty-- One Demands in 1915,

attem pt to revive

the four-power

disturb in g presence
diatel

intervention

y following

theoretically

President
consortium

of Amer ican troops
r;J
orld

far I,

ef forts

in the United

States . 72

States,

of American investments,

t heir

in 1917, the
imme-

res ·trictions

i mposed upon Japan at the la shington

of the United

Japanese

''Iils on' s

in Siberia

and the

ence in 1922, pe rsua ded the Japanese
ant agonist

in the episode

rat he r than

the extent

convinced

the

was desi ~ned to f rustr at e

in China and throughout

71 osgood, p. 341.
73Quigley, p . 36.

they had found an

It was the diplomatic

which ultim ately

th at Americ an policy

expansion

then,

that

Confer-

the Far East.73
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CHAP'l' R · II

The Manchurian

e.nd United

Crisis

the ra.n1page in Ma,nchur:ta,

tieth

The contest

oderates

a nd the

of the

expansj .onists,

In the deca

e be

ore the thrust

moderate s had dir ect ·d the fortunef
.ad e

of fr iendl y ca ncili
ernment

to

ID<
· inta:tn

r, a nchuria

the
at

tion"

t.he y ears
Japan

positi

such a cost

1904-1905.

But Japanese

bef ore the

!.anchurian

the

re gim e 1~rould have

b efore

in the

se .f-rorn their

incident

in the

had been _;uided

to t he"

'rhB milit arist

deter.r uination

had achteved

usso ...Japanese

f or e · g.n policy

means .

1931 hac seen no

on whi ch they

had attem pted to fi nd a solution

Service
P •· 224.

in Manchuria,

involvin g compromises by the gov...

of the

s p~cial

lem" by conciliatory

cons tar1t in twen-

Waahin./:,'ton in 1922 ha d been a umodel

t,

To be sure,

r etre at on th e part

-·1-

of the Ja p&nese Empire .

in Tokyo which no mi li t ristic

p er mitted.,l

the

once · again ....-and for the last

t h e favor

The agree .m0nts

between

which had been

ce ntu ry Jap an had turned

time--to

Policy

of Septe ber 18, 1931, Japan went on

On the night

i tal;":tsts

States

in

~far of

pe ;r·iod
by men who

·anchurian

prob-

cli que,

1Henry 1.. Sti mson and McGeor ge Bundy, On Active
·
In Peace and 1fa ;t ( e1t1 York:
Harp er & Bros., 1947),
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however,

had conti nua lly

ialism.

In the

determined

parl

to undert

forei gn ·trade

na.tion,

s ought

aga inst

polic y which the United
econo my fe lt

the pinch .

itself

Mith

ado ,.,..
ted ...-the

impBrialis

a f ing er on t h e pulse
arists

1931, swiftly

over-runni

minute

attem pted desperately

order

at hand with

the

in mid-Se pte mber,
provinces

of

th eir p eople and the

The gover nment in Tokyo,

ha d le rned of t he plot
to sto p it,

an

m whic h they

of the nation,

ne; the J4anchurian

accomp li.

Ja pane se

stricke n by econo mic

had moved decisively

and presant ing in short

"1'
0r ld t.rith a fait

Ja panese

abr oad.

had been ready

lo win g terms to a people

Ja panese milit

at the last

beggar-my ...nei ghb or

of trade

pro gram of f orceful

bl i ght ,3

When other

f ormer a ccept ance of a pro gr am

ba~ ed up on the pe a cef ul purs uit

in

Between 1929

Under su ch conditions,

The expansionists

the

by r a isin g prohib -

i mports--a

States

opinio n moved away from its

pr esGnted

in ha lf.

depression

t,o expor t the

from a

vastl y i mpor t a nt to

of Ja_ an,

•1as slashed

tari ff barriers

alternative

of action

did much to di"cr edit

in the eyes of the Ja pa nese peo le.

th at maritime

China,

course

which resulted

circu mstances

- wid e economic depression

and 1931 the

itive

extre mist; s t they were

n ee of the

ke a more "positive"

The grind:i:ng

moder ates

imper-

2

in r-ianchuria.

nations

the eco nomic

of the modera t es ,-Jith a pro ram of active

objectives

worl

sou ght to re place

f elt

which

and ha.d

compelled

to r at ify

26
t he a ct ion " doub tless

a revolt

did not

of t he Army would ensue.n4
The official

upon Mane uria
de liv ered

irection

Americ

..,.,
tates

and Ja pan .

T .sis

t ate Henry

Hoov er,

woul

''the

treaty

citiz en s in China,

not reco gn ize

r:Lgl ts

inclu di n

erei gnty,

the indepen dence,

istrative

inte grity

0

Jennings

those

in the

T·hen

had no tified

both

China

that
of any

t 2tes

or its

to the

GOV-

1 an d admin-

of non rec ogn ition.

ave full

Far Eas t.

at t h e

of China."5

cre di t to

•illia

a precedent

m
of non-

J apan had lod ged its

'rwenty-,._ne DeLan s aga inst

notor:tous

the l e·: lity

whi ch relate

ryan for providin g hi m with

reco gnition

L. Stimson

of the United

epublic

how~ver,

whi ch had

or agree ment which

T1is was th e Sti mson doctrine
Sti mson hi mself,

which vfas

caveat,

or the territori

of t he

assaul t

infor med both pa rties

de f a cto situ at ion nor of any treaty
..·i ht i mDair

to Ja nan's

7 , 1932 in a note

by Secr et ar y of,

of Pre sident

United

n response

c ame on J--nuary

to bot h China

been prepared

the

th at if it

in the convi ction

Chin a in 1915, Bryan

and Japan . th a t t h e United

.:.:,tates

,1ould not reco gn ize any agree ment which vi ol at ed American
ri g ts

und er t h e Op en Door •.6
Secr eta r y Sti mson ha d van t.ed to ha lt

t;he Japan ese

4Jos ph v • Ballanti n e, ·rt lukden to Pear l H- rbor :
The Foreign Policies
of Ja p n," For ign Af airs,
.. , II

(July,

1949),

652 .

5sti mson, pp . 235-)6 .
6cordell
Hull, The ' emoirs

York:

The ~ a cmillan

Co .,

of

1948) , 270.

ordell

Hull,

I ( New
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by takin g mor e f orce .ful mea sures

ag:;
a inst

advan ce s in };an churia.

mer l can p eople were "in no

mood to depart

Butt

.he

fro m the non-ent

their

ngl ement tr adition."7

Gr ea t Depress i on had a:iv en rise

even more in u pon the mselves

.

i solati onist

Sti mson .hi m""elf

in Move mber of 1931 t,ha.t ttt h e p olic y of imp osing

of f ore ~ •••
rejection

san ctions

League of Nati ons. tt8 The Ameri c a n p eo pl e,

Sti mson wrote , ha

opinion

't-1rote

had been rej ect ed by Americ a i n its

of · the

upon treati

The

to a ,.l ethor a. of domesti c

probl ems whi ch had t urned a tr aditionally
p eople

imper ialis tic _

ttcteliber ,:tely

ch osen"

e s "h i ch had a chieved

the

to rely ·solely

,dl nction

of rrpubl ic

a.lone. n9

Wit h t hi s ba ckgroun d of po pular
Sti mson doct rine

sentime,t

of non reco gn :l.ti on achieved

poLul ar su_J.ort i n th~ United

States .

p o sit ion of the Uni ted

poli cy had onl y one f l aw:
mi li t a rists

it

0t a tes

did not

consider

Aggr essive

which ri ght ha ve provoked war ·were neatly
the moral

, the
ab le .

mea sures

avoi ded and yet
was se cure.

The

to , t he Ja pan e s e

ttf or as much as f i ve 1,im .:1.
te::,n in Manchuria

else whe re.10

With

ea ch new rep ort

of Japanes e. adva nces in

iV;
an chu r ia and wi t h mount in g evid ence that

th e Japanese

eign offic e was swi ng-i ng i n beh ind th e militarists,
be c ame i n crf.~~-::,
in r.rly cle a r that

wit hin the Imp- rial
7
.
Bailey,

9Ibid.,

the

10J3ailey,

f or-

it

f orce s of mod er·ation

Government had failed

P• 249 .

or

in t h eir

8
Sti mson, P• 244.

P• 2gl.

efforts

to re gain aut ½ority.11

No matter

what illus·ono

the

about the ef f ica cy of nonrecognition,

entertain
aware

of its

purely

moral

severe

American

limitations

weapon designed

the Japanese

conviction

in

efense

"less

. nl2

as a method

'!'he United

of international
it had hardly

morality

as a

of bring i ng

dip lo matic victory
had e f fectively

resisted

the world to intervene
the Asian mainlanct . 13

States

h d spoken

all

As for the threat

.

By mid - Jan-

m"J.it ar y and
in 'l'okyo

The g overnment

atte mpts by other

in Japan's

military

which Japan's

nation s of

penetration

invasion

ever been a factor
States,

f or the

in terms of American trade

whol e, or in terrns of i mports
com,_11odities.1 4

lo-

was not in 1931 nor indeed had it

of much ec onomic significance

either

of

of

might pose to Americ an commercial interests

cated there , 1anchuria

up

, but in terms of

a complete

in Man churia.

the

couJ.d come from

been very successful

u ry of 1932, Ja pan had achieve

Manchuria

'fh e pol:i. c y served

th a t no good whatever

bre a ch of treaties

diplomacy

.

Sti mson was

to reason than as a method of reasserting

the

United

~merican peo ple might

To Sti mso n's

or exports

as a

of any i mportant

vay of th i nking , the

fund amental f a ctor at st ake was American presti e;e in China
and throughout
that

it

th e Far East , a fa ctor

of su ch i mportan ce

tr anscend ed in his mind any i mmediate

damage which

llstimson,
p . 228.
13.!J2i£., p . 239.
14Farley , Fa~ Eastern

29, 1936) , 163.

Surve x. V (July

29
mir.rht be done to Ameri can tra

e in Manchuria.

convict ion that,

int

analy~is,

material

s in East

interest

e final

tive

su .,p ort

i nte gr i ty .nl5

as hi s

a ll of America's

ts i a hi nged u on ret ai ning the

-r es-ti g ,., whi ch the Unite d States
tr a iti onal

It

enjoy e1d ·'by virtu e of its

of Chin a 's territ

ori al and admi nlstra

He b eli eved th t

if

and inde nend.ence were allo wed to bed
ag re ssion, the future

-

China 's sovereignty
trc y ed by Japan ese

of the Uni ted States

in the Far East

would be pl a ced i n s eriou s jeop rdy; a stru ggle betw ee n
China and Japan mi ght not only destroy
pr ofi t ab le"

the ttpoten ti a ll y

commerci al r l at:ton s between China and t he

Unite d Sta t es , but might even constitute

America's

territorial

pos se ssions

a dange r to

in tha t region .

For

Sti mson, t hen, Americ an polic y could not be based upon any
narro w appraisal

of what t e Americ an corn·1ercial

stood to los e by Ja.pEm's war in Man churi·,.
insisti

1g u on

stability

a close

It was by

::.nternat:i.onal

order

and

t h~t Ameri can pre sti ge and , conse uent ly ,

Americ a' s mat rial

best

res pe ct for

cornmunity

int ere st s throus-·hout

Eas t Asia

could

be ser ved . 16
In formulatin

g h i s p olic y , S·ti ms o:n had be en ti gh tly

encircle d by t he pr evailing
peopl e,

t erirpera ment of t he Amer i can

'rhe dominant tho ugh t of the period

urroundin g t he

_,__
____________________
_
Manchur i an crisi s was all

15osgoo d , p , 353 .

for avoidance

of Leagues and

30
tr eat ies or · YlY agree ment wl ich i mplied
Lar ge l y for

t'

is

r eason , it

commit ment s.17

canno t be sa id t h t th e .~merican

·overnment , be t wee n 1921 and 1933 > a.dvan c ed very far
t e conce pt of c o ll ectiv e secur i ty .

should

retai

Unit ed St ates

policy.

a P."a
i n st takin g part
a,ggressor~lB

opinion,
h:Lm:

The clim ate of opi ni on r an stron

in any common a ction

a gr and -scale
policy

a ai nst an

affir mation

of the United

vt·tes'

tra-

of th e Open Door as expr es se d in the doc-

of nonreco gnit ion.1 9

and Ja pan .

e rsistent

in its

·were no IV cle arly

inte grity.
ttf:LctionsT!

opp~i tion

On th-e other
of the

Nine

i nde penden ce an d territorial

stood Ja pan, irrit
Power Treaty

After

Janu ary,

an d unbending

1932, America's
hatred

autocra cy be came incre as in gly important
attitude

ated by the
i n its

s i ngl e-h ndedl y upon the

sympathy for Chi na and its

popular

United

t.o any a ctio n which would

det erm in a tio n to imp os .e a solution

China problem . 20

drawn b et ween the

On one sj_de stood the United States,

thre aten the Chinese Republic's

tional

ly

Unab.le to de fy such a p ower f ul b or y of ·

The lines

States

dominated

Stimson had t aken t' e only course h e saw o~en to

_i.tional
trine

1'he dictum t at America

"freedo m of a ctio nt th orou ghly

n its

toward

toward Far Eastern

tradi-

of milit aris m and
factors

in the

policy.21

17nexter Perkins,
'lThe De par tment of St a te an d
American Pub lic Opinion,"
'l'he Di p lomats
1 19 -19
, ed.
Gor don A. Craig, · an d Felix Gilbert
· Pri n ceton: ··Princeton
University

Press,
18

Ibid.,

1953), PP• 2S4-85.

P • 298.

20sti mson, p . 255.

19 ariswold,

p . L~24.

21osgood , p . 360.
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'l'he moderate

cabinet

power on Deeember 11, 1931,
t-o r e ain

control

01,er

of Baron Shideha ra. fell
It had fou ght a losing

the military

att a ck had be en 1.&unched against

vesti g s of opposition

a s ra pidly

from

r.moved,

sin(te

the

i anchuria.

battle

...eptember
W-' th th

last

t he conques t of Manchuria

comple ted 1-•rith t e capt ure of Chinchm.,1 on Jan.-

11

uary 2, 193z.22

The Open Door Closes In Manchuria
It soon became clear
control

military
:panied

over Chin se territory

elimination

by the

fr om the conquered

non-com petitive
the Japanese
far made. 23

of foreign

ares.

commodities
to a$sist

bu sin ess and industry
~as restricted

them in consoli

Durin g the next several

in 1 anchuria.

i ncl udi~g the small
im ort nce.24

at i ng the g ins thus
yea rs,

concerns,

All other

22 Gr i

ed.

'By

mono oly of

forei gn int(irests,

bankin g , trading,

findin g themselv

Ja pan~s e

reat:J_y incr e

American one, steadily

Foreign

to

and t ho se items most ne ded by

1935, Ja pan had a chieved a vi~tual

lnvestments

and

was to be a.ccom-

Forei gn trade

invest ments in Manch ria

ca pital
early

th at Japan 's political

d i 1 inished

in

and construction

s at a cc ns idera .ble

dis a 'vantage,

\Told, p , 1.,21.

23 Jilli am C. Jo nstone, The Uni t.ed States and
ew O:rder ( fow York: Oxford University
Pres s,
1

Ja p
194

, P • 142.
24John R. Stewart, "Forei gn Inve stmen ts in
r anchuria,n
Far •astern $urvey, IV (June 5, 1935),

1.
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began to .-.rith draw . 2 5
1

The Open Door for foreign

investments

had never , in fact,,

been held Yery wide.

to Ja pan's

conquest

trade

mili tary

and industry

the Rus sians

held 70

er cent of all

foreign

accounted

"or less

were predominately

fo reign

in I•-ianchuria

~;13 , 200 , 000.,

These

business

ti me were

interests

on, as well as banking

import ance, the profita

November , 1934, with the passage
Under its

provisions

, the

sale

made a govern ment monopoly .

agreed

at this

interest
ble field

oil,
faci l-

in Manchuria
of oil

dis -

, was eli min at ed by ,the Ma.nchoukuo authorities

tribution

continue

investments

of a commerci al natur e. including

The only Ameri can commercial

of any real

Russia' s holdin g s

than 4 per cent of the total . 27

tobacc o, and mat ch distributi
ities.

in Manchuria,

of the ,-1hole , or approx-

All other

Ameri can investments
esti mat ed at only

i n the hands

In 19.30, Japan

invest ments

808 ,4 83,0 00 .

a bou t 25 pe r cent

;:-295, 000 , 000 .

i mat ely

in 1931, foreign

Ja pan ese. 26

or the

at an estimated

constituted

In the da ys prior

had been al most exclusively

of e ither

valued

of the area

in f-!anchuria

to import
to sell

of an oil monop oly law.
and· distribution

oi' oil

was

Forei gn compani es could

petrol eum products , but only if they

exclusively

2 5T. A. Bisson,
_Fqre i gn Poli.cy Reports,

26stewart,

in

to the Manchoukuo Oil
ttAmerican

in the

1'..a r Eas t,"

XII (Febru0.ry 1 , 19.37), 274.

Far Eastern

27--2!..:..,,
I' . d
p . s·2 .

Policy

.onopoly

,..Survex, IV (~Tune 5; 1935)~ $1 .

.f
33

Bureau.28
The American
against

the

Government

a ppli cation

of this

lair on the

was a violation

of the Open Door, a pro test

Britain

~et he:rland s,2 9

and t he

these

clai m to open door tre atment

and the Texas Oil

area .JO

in

had succeeded

Petro-

Company t _o c ose the ir

of 19341 Ja pan made still

atta ck upon the do ctrine

of th e Open Door .

Arnau; a spokesman for the Japanese

rele ased a st at ement to the
Japan 1 s clai m to ex-elusive

control

Asia.

The note

to a ct "sin g le-hundedlyrt

in East Asia,
,:,g.,..

anothe r

On April

17,

Forei gn Jffice ,

pr ess whi ch boldly

le dg ed _th t Japan had a "special

order

in that

to the Open Door , 1934-1936

In the spring

Eastern

th a t, , by

in Manchuria.31

New Threats

Eiji

it

echoed by Great

th e Standar d-Va cuu m Oil Company , the Asiatic

leum Company,
offices

that

po ·wers had for -

By mid- 1935, the Manchoukuo Oil Monopoly
forcing

grounds

Tokyo replied

refusi ng to r eco gnize Manchoukuo,
fei ted their

protests

made frequent

in China .32

put f orth
It a cknow-

posi tio n and miss ion•

cont en ded that
in order

Japan ·was compelled

to mait : t ain

a res pon sibility

in

p eace

and

whi ch Ja pan shared

6

.., ,.1.bid. • p . o4.

177.
1937),
Foreign

29Lockwood, :F'ar Eastern
30Gris wold , p . 442 •
.31Bisson, Foreign Policy

Survex, V (Aagust 12, 1936),
Re :eorts , XII (F ebruary

1,

274.
32T. A. Bi sso n , nstru g ,le of the Powers in Chin a,"
Pol i CY, Re:eo:rts,

XII

{August

1 , 1936} , 122-23.

·

34
with Chi na alone.

The J apanese Gover nment would, there-

f ore,

oppose any attem pt on the

other

power s in wha.t was exclusively

p .

t of China to involv e

duty o.f China and

the

Japan • .3.3
As for outside
the m against

undertaking

might be prejudicial
existing

would acquire

provide

political

of Easter n Asia.

use would,

the note concluded ,
between Chi na, Ja pan,

Ja pan, therefore.

of

would be opposed to

rinci ple.n34

The Amau state ment was a direct

mental

challen ge to

and American ri ~hts and intere ~ta in China .

s ecifically,
question

loans to

and woul d en dan ger the pea ce and order

suc h proje cts nas a matter

British

sendin g military

to China, - or contracting

the frie ndly rel ations

countries,

assistance

Supplyin g China wi t h

g air dromes in China,

fu nd s f or political

and other

for under

and financial

si gnificance.

or observers

tend to disturb

in China which

i nterfsts,

even technical

con. tructin

instructors

any operations

to Japanese

conditions

war pl anes,

nations , the Amau state ment warn ed

the ter ms of the pro nounce ment called

tra whole series
rel ations

11ith

of American

China.tr35

the

the United States

t;50,000 ,0 00 wheat and cotton

Nanking from the Reconstruction

into

econo mic and e overn-

One ye ar earlier,

Chinese Govern ment had arr anged with
a three-year,

1 ore

Finance

credit

Corporation.

-

35I bid .

for

to
In

35

19301, the China National
formed

with

l\fati on alist

Aviation

Corporat ion had been

55 p er cent of t h is air li ne
Government while

hel d by Pan- Americ

the remainin g 45 pe r cent was

n Airway s.

Toward the . end of 1933 , the

and Manufa ct uring

Central

Aircraft

gan ized

in China,

wi th the

Curtis

s- WrL >ht

cent . 36

By 1936 , this

military

air craf t a year

Corporation

manufacturing

Company controlling

ft

or-

Company had bee n

ownin::, 64 pe r cent of t hi s air cr aft

and t he Dougla s Airer

ovmcd by the

plant ,

16 per

another

concern would be turning

out sixty

for th e Nanki ng Gover nment , 37

During 1932 and 1933 , mor eover , the Aeronauti cs Trade
Di.vision

of the Commerce Departm ent had cooperated

thes e American ai rcr aft

corp or ation s i n the selection

number of American aviation
lishing

training

s ame pe riod,

schools

the

with

who assisted

of f icers

fo r Chine se pilo ts.3S

Selle of American - a i r cr a ft

includin g mil it ary pla nes, had greatly
from '?2·07 , 000 in 1932 to · 2,359,000
The Amau statement

received

of a

in estabDuri ng th is

an d accessories,

expand ed, rising

i n 1933.39
·world

publicity

.

I ts

c laim to Japane se pree min en ce in East Asi a could not be

allowed
State

to pass unansiered

Cor e ell

.

With in ten days , Sec retary

Hull had formulated

of

'lashingt on 's official

36 Lockvi:rood
, Far East er n Survey,

V {August 12, 1936 ),

37Bi sson,

Foreip.;n Poli cy Reports , XI I (August , 1936),

38 Bisson,

Ii"orei gn Poli cy Reports,

123.

1936) , 275.

39Bi s s on, Foreign
1936 ), 123.

Poli cy Reports,

XII {February
XII (Augu st l ,

1,

36

On April 28, 1934, A ba ssador

response.

to the japanese

called

attention

virtue

of existi

obligationstt

Forei gn Off ice.

to thr:i fact

In this

note,

Hull

t ha.t the United States,

ng treaties,

rtnad certain

r gh ts

in China a.nd was associated

and o't,her nations

Grew,

in Tokyo, deliver ed Hull's

the r anking Ameri can official
reply

c.

Joseph

in certain
:,

and

vd 'th Ohina , Japan,,

ultila:teral

,(

by

treaties

relating

to the Far East,40

No nation , Hull reminded Japan , could,

without

of the other

the consent

sta.t~s

endeavor to make conclu sive its

fully

where t h ere a re involved

the

the

of other

le g iti mate

interests

ri ghts,

To t hi s communication,
no official

res ponse,

concerned,

will
the

tt'ri ght-

in situations
obli ga tions,

sov erei gn states

a nd

. tnli,l

the Ja pan e se Government made

and the m~tter

,ias a llo wed to rest.

Hull had rGaf f'irm ed American al le gian ce to the same principles

and t re aty ri ghts which Stimson had s ought to uphold

at the t ime of the Manchurian
St ates

i n ci d ent

i n 19.31,

The .United

Goverrunent had &P'ain r efus ed to re cognize

ri ght to disregard
boldne ss,

them.4 2

did not succeed

The imau statement

1

1s

Japan

for a~l its

in curt aili ng Ameri can relations

with China.
On December 19, 1934, Japan gave notice
intended

to end participation
' ·-

--

in the naval li mitations

40Hull., I, 279.
41Bisson, American · Pqlicy
42Grisrold,

p. 444 .

it

that

in . the F~r East,

p.

31.

37
.

treaties

of 1921-192 2.

mul ation

of American policy

at the

Those entrusted

in the Far East were once again

cro ssroad s o.f decision.

were two poss ible

there
States

dght

1ith the for-

As Secret~ry

courses

of action

which the United

One was to ·withdraw

follO,rf.

ha ps with di gnity,n

from the Far Eas t.

Hul l saw it,

gradually,

nper-

This would mean ,

Hull believed,

ac quies cence in the nullification

tre aty rights,

the closin g of the Open Door, the aoandon-

ment of China to the ac quisitive
caishment
China,

on the Asian mainland .
Pacific

g of American
It would,

on the maintenance

of China's
upon the

t erritoria
rights

in

co mmercia l rights
.t turn

over the

was to continue

of law, the faithful

l and adminis tr ative

and interests

a,P-gr€ssi ve ,n policy

toward

integrity,

.eant na firm,

of
to

obs erva nce

of A eric a ns in the

and
Fai-· East .

though not

Japan. 44

As a nati on attempting

felt

nationals

in effect

of action

To pursue the latt ..,r course

world

relin-

area west of Hawaii to the domination

The oth er course

Japan.4-3

insist

oi Japan,

of the ri ght to prote ct Am rican

and the surrenderin

entire

designs

of Americ an

to uphold th e doctrine

of

order .under law, both Hull and Presiden t Roosevelt
that

t hey could

eourse •

The

continue

Ameri ca's

deep-seated

ost

do no other

i mmediate

traditional

c n cer n for

the

than

reason

for

policy
security

choose
this

the

second

d-ecision

to

in East Asia was the
of America.,;i territorial

38
possessions

\>"Jestern Pacific

i.n the

long recognized

Islands,

h ee l'' in the Far East,

.

The Philippine

as t h e United

was still

States '

0

Achilles

very much Japan's

hos-

tage . 4-5
Durin ~ th e next several

years after

the conquest

of

Manchuria , a new phase of Ja panese economic and po litical
penetrati.on

opened in North China .

The technique

smugglin g was employed in a cons ci ous effort
both Chinese and Western
smugglin g operations
the

interests

seriously

in that

affected

ewers in th e ir trade

Western

t o undermin e
region.

of J apanese goods reached

"'63 , 000 , 000 .

relations

sold to China for that

of all

1.
·Jith China.

In

illega l

a tota l value of about

If Ja pan ' s le gal exports

added to t his f igure , the total

Thes e

the position

1935, it was esti mated by the Bank of China that
entry

of mass

to China in 1935 ar e

value of Japanese

goods

year can be placed at over

declined
from ~:i
69,0 00,0O0 in 1934 to ~~
38 , 000 ,0 00 in 1935.4-6 Both
100 , 000 . 000 .

the United

Ja pan's
political

By contrast,

and Great Britain

States

e f forts
status

Unit ed States

exports

prot ested

"to brin g about a substantial
and condi tions

nor"!:her~ pr ovinces . »47

in several

Such protests,

against
chang e in the

of China' s

h m'-lever , were

complet el y ineffe ctive .

45Griswold,

pp . 449- 50.

46Bisson , Forei gn Policy
1936) • 131.
4 7I bid . , p . 129.

Reoorts,

XII (August 1 ,

I
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Sino-:-American

Economic Relations

on th e Eve of War
On the eve of Ja pan' s m1.l itary
pr oper,

by

bu siness

American

The9e in.vestments

00 .

national

s.

Nothing

1936 , the only Ameri can issue
itie .s was t he one- f ourth

American bankers

in Chinese

of Chinese

Government obli -

th ,Jt the

pr oject

Pr eside nt 'I'aft made a drama.tic

In

Govern ment sec ur--

shar e of th e Hukuan g

be recalled

in this

to American capital.

and not very ~mccessful.

ati on s co ntinu ed t o be small

It wi ll

re mai ned predom-

had ha ppened to make

Si milarly , Americ an investments

of 19 11.

at a

ho l ding s in pro pert ies owned and operated

Chines e cor poration s more attractive

pa rtici

was secured

bonds

ailway
pation

of

only aft er

appea l to the Chinese Regent

th at American ca pit al be allo wed equal partici-

requesting
pati on with

an d German funds .~ Of the

Brit is h , French,

ori ginal cf l,500 ,0 00 alloted

£ 1,402,0 00 were still
payments

upon China

American invest ment s in China were estim·ted

maximum of ~.200,000,0

inately

assault

to the

outstanding

United

States

,

i n 1936 , with i nterest

by£402 , ~10.4 8 The dire ct return

in arrears

en joy ed by ·Americans from such invest ments re main ed a uneg ..
ligi ble it em" even in t he Great Depression

year of 1935.49

By 1936 , the pre dictio ns of a vas t China trade
still

to be re a.lized.

The Prowth whi ch had occurred

were
in the

Far Easte rn t rad e must b@ attri but ed, not to Chi na , but
pr i marily to other

countries

;

the Phi li ppines,

British

4 8Lockwood, Far East ern Surve;y , V (Augus t 12, 1936),
49Ibid.,

p.

183.

40
Malaya,

the Netherl and s Indies,

an d above all , Japan .

1936, Japan acc ounted for no less
American

trade

accounted

ag re ga t .e imports

in 1936, whi l e the United

~hile

change:

2.3 per cent of exports
i mports
minor

and

ce ntury,

Americ a's

at ~t82, 800 ,000.

best

cu stomer

State s was Japan's

best

custo mer.

va lue of America's
its

along

ti mes tri ple d that

re ·lative

with
i mportance
and

in 1901-1 905, to 3.2 per ce nt of
in 1931-1935,

the way. 52

to Ja )an from the first
American tra de

trade

from 2,7 p er cent of imports

3.7 per cent of exports

fluctuations

ho stility

received

below Japan in each ca pa city.51

the dollar

little

Of

third

China ha d grown t hro ugh the years,
revealed

States

YOrth $171,0 00 ; 000.

Japan was the Unitecl States'

Chi na ranked well

exports.

the United

from China wer e valued

of

whi le China

f or only $55, 400,000 of America's

from J apan commodities

In brief,

In 1936, the value

to Ja pan was ~204,300,000,

from the two countries,

imports

than 43 per cent of all

with t he Far East .50

American exports

In

ith

Des pite

years

only

hlith

a policy

of

of the t wentieth

Ja pan had doubled and some~

wit h China .53

Among the ite ms whi ch loomed l arg e in America's

exports

to t he Far East dur i ng the mid-'thirties

cotton,

toba cco, and petrole um products.

ted rnore t han one-third

of th e value

50Farley , Far Eastern
51Griswold, p . 468 .
52Farley, Far Eas tern
53Gri swold,

p . 46$ .

ere

Cotton repres en-

of all

American
29, 1936) , 163.

Survey,

V ( July

Survey,

V {July 29, 1936), 163.

41
exports

to

ex ports

to Ja pan, t h G cotton

concern

to the Southern

trade,

•~ast Asia .

never

while

that

one-third

rette

half

of this

1935 ,

It, •.-1as chiefly

i9 per cent

flue-cured

in the 192$-19 29 season,

the

of the

of the

for the f act that

i n 1928 - 1929 .

and more than

ex ports

A h i gh t ariff

prev ented

to Asia , exports

to the

tobacco.55

t,han a bout

2 per c ent of domestic

products.

China too

States'

ex ports

requirements

166-67.

0

production

while

Japants

made her an j_:ncr easingly

for crude petroleum,

re pre$ nted

a lar ge percentage

of kerosene

gasoline,

industry.

non-a gricultural

Far East

gas oil,

54Farley, Far Eastern. Survey,

Japan

a considerable

group 1.1ith

was the most important

7 per

as compared with

in the Far Ea.st in 1935 was the petroleum

oil

of flu e-

only about

in 1934-1935,

in

market

Chinese

bei ng a l ar ge consu mer of American leaf

Although

c iga-

Chinese

to fa.11 off drastically

decline

production

.

to t,he Far ltast,

'.rhe growth

The major industrial

sold

of this
'thirties,

States'

to Ea st Asia re presented

of domestic

stake

share

the early

of the United

caused ex ports

cured tobacco

1

China's

amount v as exported

whi c h was res ponsible

fro

was of th e most vital

during

to China. and Japan.

industry

cent

stat es.

of all

of Ja pan increa s ed.54

was ex ported

mainly

ng more than half

trade

lar ge , declined

MorH than

tobacco

Constituti

item
no more

of refined

of the United
gro win g f uel

i mportant
and fuel

customer
011.56

V (July 29, 1936},

42
Throu ghout the early
fundamental

chan g e in the

China . wa~ perceptible

.

agriculture
protectionism,

this

p eriod

wheat,

advauces

wheat

to lir 1it

· lour,

an d tobacco,

products

the bulk of China's

l'lhich constituted

than 20 per

increased

exports

fro m 1932 to 1937 .

in the eX't,ort trade
'·

~

consisted

of wood oil

pri marily

from t h is area of western

57Kurt Bloch,
and the
P • 13.

'lar,°

and goat skins.

growin:,, par-

In

fro~ China

both

of which ca me

China.59

than the changes wh ich took

"'Chinese-American

Far •astern

This increase

of Szechwan Province .

1936, about one - t hird of American imports

more important

oods dimin-

to th e United

was lar gely t he resu lt of the Unit ed Sta.tes'

Vastly

than 15 per

import ti ons of Americ n

betw een 1932 and 1935; Chinese

ticl pation

from

from Ameri c .5

i mports

Stat es steadily

and to

imports

in 1935, and in 1936> to less

\ hil e Chinese
ished

of

The four agricultural

i n 1932 had shrunk to less

cent of the total
cent of all

in Ch i~ese

i npor-t ations

output.

States

was a

in empha sis

re place t hem with domestic

the Unite

there

with

ng a pol icy o.f' a ri cul tur a l

Ch i.na was able

American -cotton,

t·rade

and to ward an increased

odities

from tee . olo gical

By instituti

.

a

of America's

oods . 57 This shift

demand for manuf a ctured
in part

however,

of China away fro m t h e impor-

co

of agricultural

resulted

cha racter

rrhrou ghout

gro wi ng tr .end on the part
t ation

'thirti~s,

Survey,

VIII

,sc-onomic ..el ation s
(J anuary

19, 1....-39),

43

place

in the Sino-American

of a silver
States

purchase

trade

inau gurated

policy

Government in 1933.

unli mited
Republic

market ab ility
of China

1

'

wer e the econo mic re sults

This po li cy re sto re d ttvirtual

to silver•

and t he United

ment whi ch provided

60

the gre atest

removed .

With
obstacle

as well

to Chin ese currency

as economic

resources

exc hang e,

reform was

of t h e Silver

ab l e to se ll

hoard of silver

of liruid

Thes e agr ee ments

the esta blish ment of dollar

of 1934, China was at last

war chest

States

Bank of China .

and .b roade n ed •.6 1

Under the provisions

unmarketable

b y th e United

from the Central

were to have the gre ates t polit ical
.

con cluded an agree-

in 1938, the sco pe of t he ori gina l

arran gement "'ras extended

si gnificance

Purc has e Act

he r pre vi ou sly

, thereby

exchanging

totalin

g more than

j_t,

for a

bot h absol ut ely an d in
available
to Ja pa n. 62

400,000 , 000 , a sum of' importance
compar ison to the resources

60ibid . , pp . 15- 16 .
1939),

62 Bloch,
17.

ly

In ~1e.y of 1936, the

States

for the purchase

of lar ge amounts of silver
In 1937 and again

by the United

Far Eastern

61Jo hnston e, pp . 1$8- 89,
Survey,

VIII

{January

19 ,

44

CHAPT
lfHE SI ro-JAP JtNE,'E v1AR,

III

1937-1938:

THE CH.11.LLENGE

TO A~iERICAN I NT EST I N CI INA
Japan Invades Ch:Lna, 19)7
On July 7; 1937, Japanese
second

all-otlt

direct

this

attack
assault

upon China.

cau.se for

nrl grew out o:t a nli:nor

in cident

near

Imperial

Japanese

Japanese

army had once again chosen th~ ti me and the plac e

for

the att

e.fore .

provoked

launched the

The i mmediate

upon the mainl

Peiping,

forces

force$

stationed

ck, much as it

ex ansionism

weeks

fter

13ia.

Thus,

> moi"'e...

the f :ghtin

,, Quite

of hostilities

that

to mold a "new order"

July

a ggression

192$.

to the

the
in Ea.s t

had been provoked

by the Army, it was not now out. o.f consonant
er1iment' s avowed obj ective

since

gover nment of Prime 4inister

the beginning

lt.ho ugh the

of

Konoye revea l ed to the Diet sev~

Jap · nese Government intended
1:

year s

the Ja panese Govern m.ent i n 19.37

to limit

contrary , Pr:;tme Minister
eral

army ha d been bent

g moderate

effort

only . .six

on the As;i.an continent

the

Tanaka in 1932, however,
ma e no real

The

conse quence of th.:> fixed policy

upon .. hich

Unlike the totterin

in the area$

ha d in Manehuria

Th is n€ W a ggression

overt w s a. n tural

and enlar ged upon by t.he

with

th e gov-

of . redu c ing China to a st ate of

e.1

vassala

Conditions
part

existi ng in Japan had played a large

in the evolution

had entered

its

of a burgeoning

All usable

Anxious attempts

old and net'li industries,

near

the pressures

ha.d been feeling

population.

cultivation.

exp nd both

policy which

second st ag e with the July 7 attack

The home islands

Petping.

under

of the expansionistic

land was already

were. unden.ra.y te
b:ut capital

were l'imited

and ra w mat erials

es s~n tial

pro gre ss was to be made in th _is quarter.

spite

if

of such serious

determined

t ho.s

li. mit&tions,

catastrophic

import

effects

Ja.~an' s re-

of' gene ral

more diff icult

pro ctuets abroad.

The nation

had be -en further

b y t he i mpact

of a

Many foreign

as , a measu :re to fig-h t

barriers

increasingly

it

pos ition

and world - wide de pr~ssion..

the j_nternal

had been
equ a l t -o

In short,

precarious

mid-' thirtie~

had raised

force

In

had be-en so.dly out of balanee,2

Ja pan .' s already

na tions

powers.

and h$r ambitlons

jeopard:i .zed in the

la.i."lds were

the nation

to hav e a milita ry and n:lval

of · the more affluent

sources

from foreig:n

resources

economic -collapse,

making

for Japan to S-""ll its
pos s es sed .ample gold

till

r eserve s, but if t his sup ly were to be nraine d off by~
pro lo nged perio d of unfavorable
would be f'orced

to dr op back to _a poor@r standard

1Balla.n ti n e,

2Herbert Feis

Pri nc eton

balance of t:rade, Japan

Unj_versity

For ei gll Affairs,

XXVII (July,

o.f
1949 ), 654.

he Road to Pearl Harbor ( Pri nceton:
1950 , -p . 3 ~

Press,
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living,

and her st ature

inevitably

di minish .

as a nation
Rather

among nation s would

than f'ac e this

prospect , the Army and the "excitedly
preferred

another

the Japanese

solution:

90 per cent

activities

of its

endan gering

Many alarmed

foreign

Japan's

Japanese

from China ..

fully

country where more than

invest;ments

expulsion

Japan must

t--:ere located _, 4 but

over Korea and , nchoukuo •.
th •t if this

believed

,of all

surge

the resu l t

Japanese

interests

soon forme d, especia l ly in t h e

a.ke its

will

flt

quickl y and force-

on the China mainland . 5

further

the firebrands
great

in that

1ere to go unchecked,

The opini.on

An analysis
offer

momentum , threatening

observers

would be the ultimate

In China,

.

was gaining

control

of Chinese nationalism

army , that

had

seem not only

for Japan to act deoisively

of nationalism

not only Japan's

also

0

eA-tension of

the territorial

abroad in 1937 made it

but urgent

the s pirit

p triotic

Empire ._3

Conditions
possible

tL"1pleas ant

foreign

support

landholders

its

.in Europe seemed to

for the bold course of aetion

advocated.

Germany and I taly .
badly neglected

of the situation

which

France and England , the two
in Asia ., were held in balan ce by

The United States,
rmy and navy that

for its
it

part , had so

was incapable

of

3Ibid _.

4nwha.t' s Our Stake in Chi na , n Business
7 , 1937, p . 15.
5Feis,
..
p . ~,. •

:·eek, August
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a war i n the western

undertal,.ing

American people, - dee ply involved
-muld

not > it

protect

appeared
fhece

into

last

bri

half

Chi na .

ercise

Chin

or to

for Japanese

·were re -lized
Imperial

a .

To eonsoli~ ate their

control

rescue

ar,s

ht indeed.

of 1937,

est ab lis h ed puppet

to

The future

ex pectations

1

In the

o to war

European colonies.6

in Cina

in ~omest.i c pro blems ,
. .,

i,ro.s Judged,

In addi t:i.ont the

Pa.cific.

to a large

degree •

pe ne·trated

if;S

deep

ga i ns , the Ja panese

t rough which fl'okyo co uld ex-

regimes

over the conquered territories.

On December

14-, 1937, the Peking

Provisional

Gover nment was formed in

·. eking

in the

North

fo:r. operat,ion

J ~anese dominat ion.

five

Four months

l ter,

on 'larch 28, 193$,

the Reformed Government of Mankin g was established
Japanese
the

s onsorshi_

lo rnr Yangtze

qu ered,

local

to ad minister

Valley.

under

Ch:Lna provinces

afre.irs

unde r

in the

As prin ci pa l cities

re gion of

were con-

syste ms of govern ment were established,

as the Ta tao or · nqreat

such

faytt Govern en.t in the area

of

Shanghai.?
Through

authorities

would reduce

this

t e creation

Japan's

sc heme of things,

obvious:

it

~ge _ci.es , Japa n ese

ad mi n i stra tive

began to i stitute

objective

as its

these

dependence

t he role

was to be a market

the

"new order"

of a regional
upon the

econo my th~t
outside

of the Chinese
forte

whi ch had

,-,mrld .

nation

manufactur

In

:1as

ed go ods

_____________________
_

of . Japan
_,_

and a primary

source of the r aw materj_ : J.s whi ch

would make those

same manufactur e:s pos s ib le .

cheap Chi nes e labor
export

industrie~

, ould be us ed to car ry f on r rd certain

ticularly
si ngle expor t co nilllo <i ty . 8

largest

Furthe rmore,

, most p

Japan 1 s Policy

te xti les,

Ja pan' s

of Commercial Exclusion
in China

As soon as the J ananese had restored
order

in those

initiated

areas

under their

a de ree of

occupation,

by the pup et govern1ents

mea sur es wer e

wLich wer e desi gned to
ar9 s.9

ensu re Japan' s economi c contro l over the subjugated
It was soon m de abundan tly
other

forei gn interests

econo i c objective

cle ar th at the pr es.ence of

~.as not compatible

s in Chin •

The

the direc t ion of Ja an se officials
but Ja anese co· erce .

inatory
by c

re 0 ul ations

institute

io n restriction

which Japanes e merchants

saddled

fa cilities,

with

hampe red

cr amped by i rn ort and exto certain

w e exempt .IO

w re not permitte d to use the

of ot her fo r-

s, i mpeded by di sc rim-

i n the use of port

and subjected

d und er

wer e detr i ment a l to all

f ound themselves

ns ors hip of corre pondence,

port restrictions,

easL1re s

A erican s and me bers

ei gn commerci al communities
t rav el and transportat

with Ja pant s

r ai l ways •Jit

tariffs

from

orei gn shi ppers
out the

8Bisso n , American Polic y in _th _e Far East , p . 96 .
9Johnstone , P • 143.
10 Jo hn R. Stewart, nThe 1ar nd Wes tern I nt erests in
N rth China , n Far Eastern .._urvey. VII ( Octo be r 12 , 1938) ,
P • 231 .
.
.
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assistan

ce-- at a pr ice--of

Closure

of the

Japanese

lower

shipping

often

forwarding

and ~,1
id tle Yangtze

ga ve to Japanese

monopoly of passen ger
tr a veled

Japanese

nd frei

the

right

Rive r to all

companies

.ht service

sect ions of t h e riv er . 11

denied

companies.
but

a l ucr at ive

on the most

\\16stern

bu sin e ss men wer e

pro perty and
had ce as ed . 12 Such was

of access

to their

warehouse s long after

hostilities

the gamut the foreign

commercial

he wish ed to continue

busine ss oper ati ons in occu pied

agent was for ced to run if

China .
The establish

uent of a Ja pan -Ch ina- Manchouku o

econo mi c bl oc under the di rection
ities

was an other

the We stern

of the Ja panese

instru ment of discri mination

businessman .

used against

In Iarc h t 1938, the Federal

Reserve

Bank of China was established

cre dits

extended

by the

on t he bas i s of yen

Yokohama Specie

Bank .

The new

North China yuan cur ren cy which was sub s equently
in convertible
the

Ja pa nese

into

any foreign

yen and the

blo c.

The net result

erable

amount o:f t estern

China , and the

author -

currency

issued

was

a nd was link ed to

"la.nchouku oa n yua n in a ti ght yen

was the immobilization
trade

of a cons id-

and invest ments

si multaneo us sti mulation

i n North

of Ja pa ne se com-

merce.13
11 ~uigley , p . 129.
12navid H. Popp er , " Progres s of the Sino-Ja panese
Conf lict

, n Forei gn Policy

1 3st ew.art,

193 8 ) , 2J l.

Repo rts,

XIV ( 1ay 15, 1938),

Far Easte rn S'1rvey, VII (October

12,

60 .
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The 1ort h China Develo pment Company and t he Central
China

Company, or ganized

Pro motion

tively,

of 1938, represented

f orce f ro m t he f ield
COfl;
sequ ence .

all

in May and Ju ne, res pec-

furth er attemp ts by Tokyo to

oth er foreign

Both or ga nizations

·were,

the Ja anese Government , established
f orm of l ar ge-scale

h oldi ng companies

business
and their

ci pal heavy i ndustries

Ja pan ese control.

China for themselves .

soo n rested

subsidiaries

ri ghts

operation,

the

contact

nationals
with

severely

restri

of Western

Since

th e \fa st•

Ja pan .15

develo pments af fe cti ng not
but t he very sovereignty

the earlie

a lien

Japane .se

of occu pied Chi na

Eco nomic control

and interests

.

unde r

dev elo pment in

of China aros e f ro m th e purcha se of Chinese
Ja panese

The s e t1• o l ar ge

cornere d the pri n-

of industrial

One of the most drastic

real

landownership

had been

economic i mper i al is m, Chi ne s e au t ho rities

of the treat y ports

Under Japanese

e da ys
ha d

i mmediat e

and concessions.

military

la nd owners were compell ed to sell

pres s re,
pro pe rty

however,

Chinese

i ndisc r i minately

14Qui gl ey, p. 125~

l5 s tewart,
193S), 234,

by

st day s of Chin a's

su cce eded in li miti ng al ien l and owners h i p to the
vi ci nity

estate

Even duri ng the most aggressiv

cted.

of

every

in the areas

al most exclusi ve ly with

only foreign

i n fact , agen cies

enter prise .1 4

Throu gh their

of any

to monopolize

and utilities

pre ...empted t he whole field

competition

Far East ern Survez,

VII (Octo be r 12,

.
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This new infringement--especially
were excluded

eountries

buttressed

citiz&ns

of other

from the same privi le ge -•furt her

the preferen tial

carvi ng out for itself

since

e,con0.rnic position

in China.16

Japan was

.

To the American businessman

resident

in China, the

economic measur es whi ch were taken by Japan in those

under its
after

control

seemed reminiscent

followed

whieh immediately

state,

Japanese

ital,

had almost

of what had occurred

of fanchouku o in 1932.

the creation

the formation

monopolies,
entirely

of the Great Wall.

areas

In the years
of that

puppet

with the aid of Japanese
eli minat ed American

It was obvious that

cap-

business

north

the same methods

were now being a pli ed in China with the same disastrous
results

almost certain
Effects

to overtake

American commeroe,17

of the War on Sino-American

By August of 1937 the fighting
Shanghai ,

aralyzing

industrial

center,

Amerlca.n business

China's

Trade

had engulf~d

mQst important

seaport

and

and the s te of 65 per ce nt of all
investments

in China,18

The Shanghai

Power Company and the Shanghai Telephone Company alone were
l6Kurt Blo ch, "Alien Landownership Versus Open Door
in China ," Far Eastern Sur vey, VII {August 24, 19381,
198-99.
.
.
17Bisson, American PoliC;( in th.e Far East, P• 96 •.
York:

18c. F. Remer , Forei~n Investments
Co., 19 3 J• p . 282.

The Macmillan

in China (New

-
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valued

19

at over ~@?40,000,000.
around the great

fighting

In the course of th e

intern

t,iona l city,

Power Company escaped

of the Shanghai

the property

serious

harm , but the

Shanghai Telephone Company sustained damage in excess of
sever al hundred thousand dollars. 20 While an accurate estimate

of uro perty damage was impossible,

of fi cials

and

don e to American holdings
the lower Yangtze Val ley alone at , 25,0 00 ,000. 21
businessmen

pla ced the injury

Chinese-American

trade

i

had been in a flourishing

ediately

first

six

prior

months of 1937, with

i1 the ye ars

of hostilities.

In t he

l a,;-: and order

extended

a lar ger area of China than at any time since
Republi c had just

Chinese

program of industrial

States

had sha.recl. in this

export

tr ad e.

gathering

begun to import

~ith

1911, 22 the

consi derab le

development.23

increase

in China's

much of Americats

19 nwhat's Our Stake in China,
August 7 , 1937, p . 14.
20J ohnstone, p . 190.

0

22 Joh nston e, p.

import and
ca pa cit y

econ omic

Business

21rrhis sum includes damage to all
both oommercial
and non~ commercial.

an

The United

industrial

dust under the impact of a severe

23Bisson,

over

goods in the pros pe ct of undertaking

amounts of ca ital

extensive

foreign

China's

condition

to the renewal

a stun-

ere dealt

1

of 1937-38.

ning blo w by the hostilities

trade

relations

in

Week,

American property ,

165.

American Policy

in the Far Eas t,

p. 95.
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many opti miB"tie h e ad s had once :•gain begun to

depression,.

drea1a of the vast

bene .fits

China undergoing

be rea ped f ro m a

modernization.

The resu..rnption
ever,

eould

that

had dashed

t h is

of th tt Sino-iJa panese
p:t"'ospe ct"'

along

Chinese · eoast,

and the bombing of Ch ine .• s li mi,ted

communications

netiwork severely

tr ade • .As a result
by

how.-

Th0 a nnounc ement by the

in l ate August,, 1937 ,. of a blockade

Ja panese

oonf1.ict,,

the

int;ernal

disru ptEr:d c.11 fore .ign

of the unfavorable

conditions

created

the war, the value of American exports to China dropped

pr ec·:Lpitously

$ 1,:559,000

from

·6,0$1,000

in August,

1937,

in the fol lo vling month of Se ptember, . wit h o:aJ.y a

recov ery by the end of the year . 24 The first

slight

of the year , however, had seen such vigorous
rel at i on s between

Amer·ic an ex ports
that

t.o

for

th~

tjWO

count ries

that

halt

tr -de

the total

v·alu e

o.t

to China in 19 37 ( j 49 , 69 7, .ooo} exceeded

19,36 ( $46 ,,gl9' 1,000).

July of 1937 reveals

Tracin g trade

returns

from

a steady dec].ine through t h fS following

twelve months of 1938~ Again comparing figure s on a year ly
bas is,

American

exp o:rts to China de clined

1936, a drop of nearly

to

$15,000~0 00 from the

:J4, , 719,000

pr~vious

yeaF .2 5
In t erms ot speci.f'i,c

comi.
11odities,

the great

24-Paul B. 'l'ay lor,
'Amer ica's
Role in the Far
Eastern Conflict,"
For.eign Pol icy: lle por,ts, XIII (February
15, 19.38) t p . 282 •
.

2 5Johnstone,

P• 168-69 .

in
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re duction

in China's

in ustrial

ac tivity

after

the begin-

ning of hosti l ities

·w·
as re f lecte d in the sharp de crea s e i.n

exports

textiles,

of American

and ir on and steel

small

trader

products

pro ducts , lu mber-,

to the Chi nese Republ i c. 26

who pa rtici

ated

of 'the war in 193 7. 2 7

in ex ports

China found the years
China's

ex ports

of war materi

tot.he

Uni ted

1937 to t he considerably
The hea': iest

Only thos e

a.ls to

1937 and 1938 dis tinctly
St tes

shar ply," spiralin g downward fro m a total
193$ . 28

The

who dea l t in the se comm
oditi es v-as pa rticularly

by the resu mption

in jured

petroleum

inde pendent

pro f ita ble .
even mor e

fell

of' ,,103 , 616,000 in

di mini sh ed sum of J 47 , 189 , 000 in
reductio ns were noted in i mports

North China , an are a of major

a ctiY i ty .

Tun g oil , the

most

by the

St ate s , coul d be su ppli ed in 1938 to only

United

abou t half

important

Ja pane s e military

from

t h e quantity

Ch ines e ra v1 material

pur chased

and va lue of 1937 . 29

Rea ctio n of th e American Busines s Community
t o Japan~se

The ext ensive
war visited
able

efforts

Agg ression

dislocation

upon Chinese-A mert can trade
of Japan e se aut horities

ei gn commerce f ro m t hose areas
fail,

whi ch the Sino - Ja panes e

to ga lvanize

to force

under its

the Ameri can commer cial

26Bloch , Far Eas ter n Surveyt
1939) , 17 .
2 7Jo hns tone , p • 180 .

1939),

29Blo ch , Far Eastern

17.

and the unmistak ...
out all

control

did not

community i n

V'.I:II (J anuary 19 ,

28I b id. , pp . 168 - 69 .

Survey

1

VII I (January

f or -

19,
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China into

Commercial groups

a ction.

ra win g fr om China , as isola .tionist

of with
United

Sta tes

determin

d to

ur ge d.
1nak e

ef' ort

every

United

State s Government .3 0

greater

vious

By the

deg ree of unani mity

of both business

were

they

to hold on, and they were

demands for the .full

•ent in their

no notion

ele ments in the

to th ·e contrrry,

Quite

persist

a far

entertatned

end of 1937, there

of attitude

and non-business

of the

protection

was

among members

groups than at any pre-

time .31

When Man churia
iness

was overrun

in 1931 , Americ an bus -

age nts in China had hesit ated. in the ir opposition

Japan .

'I'hey ha d not

dire ct threat

of Japanese
military
al most

objectives

groups

'\',1e:re

aggression

and interests

without

thoro ug hly

upon China proper,

and voiced

By 1937,

.

al -rmed by the

Americans

pros p ect

'lith

su pport

Ja pan's

in China

1
condemned ·11
okyo ts p olicy

exce ption

as a

had become cl ear , and Ameri can

heg emony over the whole of China.

assault

expansion

Japanese

own rights

to their

howeve r, Japan's
commer cial

envisioned

to

of

Govern-

for the Nationalist

ment . 32
Americans
the

inaction

a ct erize

in China wef~ '' quite

and indecision

~ashington

Far East .

resident

1942),

293.

wit h regard

denoun ce d the "professional

.30r,1asland , Th e Pacifi

(September,

which they beli eved to char-

's offi ci al position

They roundly

concerned by

c Hist or ic al Revi ew, XI

·

31Johnstone,
p. 215.
32Masland , The Pa ci fi c Histo r i cal Review, XI
( September , 1942), 295.

to the
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pacifists"

and the "Ja pan ese prota gonists"

who were so

anxious to "le ve the fie ld to the Japanesen

or the imruedi a.te

called

China.33

ithdr

The very fact that

enjoyed a wide audience
cert ain "hysterical"
that

1

wal of all

that

t hey

Americ ns from

such outr a eous demands

in the United States--even

officials

among

in Washington--made

the American people at home rnr e "uninformed"

Administration

"confused."

Unit ed States,

it

clear

it

and the

The American peopl e in the

was felt,

would be brought

to their

sen-

ses only if Americans in China took the le ad in i ndica'Cing

one.34

what should be

Americ an bus iness
task

interests

of ma.kin g the United

Th-e American busin ess

and able

to secure

United States .
most active

tates

community

ide

did not shri nk fro m the
public

in China was well

expression

of its

The American Chamers

or gan iza t ions,

to the State

Department,

Con ,ressional

committees.

in Shanghai acted

opinion

th e American

press.

views in the

of Commerce iere the

ending frequent
the White

or ganized

cables

directly

House, and to various

Th e Americ n Chruber of Commerce

a s a cle aring house for iv~ sister

ganiz at ions in Tientsin•
of business

an i nf or med public.

Hankow, and Canton.35

in China were · usually

Junior

Indic ations

well reported

The Shangha i and Tientsin

Commerce and the Shanghai American

or-

in

Chambers of

Chamber of

33The Ch ina -1~ekly Review, September 11, 1937, p . 19.
3¼he China Weekly Revie w, October 2, 1937, p . 66.

35Joh ns to ne, p . 218 .
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Commerce r egularly
United

communicated. t h eir
o:f Commerce.

Chamber

St ;.ltes

nd to

Shor tly

the

1any of t he~;e communt-

directl

ques were , in turn , transmitted
f:Lcia1.s

att i tud es to t he

y to Government

press.36

after

the out bre ak of hostil

busi ne ssmen and ot,he r residents

of the

iti es in 1937,

Americ a n communit y

at Shanghai or gan ized th e Americ~n Association
established

of-

, a body

to co or dina t e the pro ~r ams and a cti vi ti es of

Americ ans in tha .t ci ty

,,.37 Its

pri mary object:i;v~

pro mote t he saf ety of Amer ican
Shan ghai,

and wh erever

committee

frequently

Ja panese beh avior,

life . and proper ty in

els e po ssi ble in Ghina . 3$
protested

es pec ially

was to

This

to Washin gto n aga i n ...t
in case s where pe rso na l or

pro pe rt y ri ghts were viol at ed.39
Worki ng closel y .with the Americ an Associ ~t i on was
th e Ameri can I nfo r mat i on Gom.inittee , .formed :i.n Octobe r of
19) $ . 40

The I nf or mation

st atements

~'ith

Shangha i .

Its

St ates,

Americ an public
Ea st . 4l

join t

th e Americ a n Cham er of Commerc e in

most i mport ant work , h o 1cv er, was the pub~

li catio n of a series
United

Comtnitt ·e.e oft en i ssued

of bookl ets f or distribution

by means of ~ ..b io h it

in the

ho p ed to in fo r m th e

of preci se ly what was ha pp ening in the Far

1.'hese pamph lets

co nsistently

expressed

supp ort

36Masland , The Pacific Hi. tori cal Review , XI
(Se pte mber, 1942), 296 .
37 1b··1·d ., ·• 38J
_. 0 h ns t on .e, p . 219 •
39Masland , The Pacific
(Sept ember, 1942) , 296.
40 I bid.

Historical

Revie w, XI

41 J op nsto n e, pp. 221 - 23.

f or

the Chin es e and advocated

a stron ge r United Stat es policy

to war d Ja pan .

All these
dis eriminatory
initi

ted

commerci al policies

in North

1937 ...193$,

during

m~mt when it

ri

grou ps wer e bitterly

(,hina

and the

aroused

whieh the Japanese
Yangtze

They a' iJ1aude ·d the

appeared

Unit ed Stat ,es,

informin g the

of Ameri can

, 42

But at all

f lo wed .from China t o

Ameri c an pub lic

Government of J pan's

United States

Govern ...

of Ame~ican

to va.scilate

ti fles a stead y stream of i ntelligence

region.

0tates

United

hts in China • and call ed for a stiffening

pol i c y when t:ashington

the

val ley

to Japan in defonse

spoke firmly

b y the

l ate.st

and the

efforts

to el i m-

i nate all Americ an commerce from Ghina.43
Raaetion

of t he United States
to Japanese

Uit ~1 the

American

renewal

Aggression

of the

co nf lict

Government was again faced

of _determining

11hnt course

of a ction

should follow

in the F.ar East .

vergent

of _ olicy

lines

Government

·'ilith the tho--rny problem
the

whic h could

of conflict

avoided

by

eclaring

ef'fact,

acco mpanied by the withdrawal

be pursued;

with the bell i g,,.rents
the

eutr ality

, far Eas tern

States

main , di ( l) all

could be

Act of 1937 to be in

42nAmerican
Chamber at Tientsin
Businessmen , n Export Trade an d ShinpeI",
5, 19) $) J $. __,
. .
.
43stewart

United

There were three

pos si bility

193$ }, 2JO.

i n China , the

of Americ an citizens
Warns U,. St
I. · V'III ( Dece mber

.sur'v,~x, VII ( Octo ber 12,

59
and troo ps fr om danger

zones;

(2) the Unit ed States

parti cipat e in vari ou s collective

sup press

(3) the United States

war;

of Ameri can ri ;·h ts

rotection

strictly

unilateral

ort

an d intere..,ts

If this

1

ashington

a ction

fervently

against

States

or ganization

mo~ibund

to discoura ge aggression,

The Lea gue of Nations,

with

incident

that

in . 1932, was by 1937 a

·commanded no respect

from

Great Britai n an d Fran cei confronted

l awle ss nations.
a ra pidly

was nothing

had cooper ated duri ng the investi--

of the r.ttn chu rian

ga tion

there

to press

to ,join in any collective

the ag ressor.

whic h the United

favor

Sta tes.

desiring

did not f eel free

favored

purel y isolationist

·· ght be encouraged

from th e United

consid-

not find

f or wa.rd the more r ap idl y , convin ced that

While

on a

-and es pecially

and pe ce blocs--did

followed ,. Japan

to be fea re

abroad

althou gh enjoying

ity,

wi th the ad inistration.
were

cou.ld undert ake th e

in the United States-

by the isol ationist

course

to

designed

bas is.

The fi r st pos s ibi
era bl e su

measures

could

rearming

.deeply

embroiJ.ed

United

Sta:tes

Germany and an obstrepero

of Europe.

in t he gro win g tensions

itself,

further

more ., the

,us Italy,

isol at ionist

with
were
In the

spiri t

'

was at f lood tide,
collective

makin g American

a c ion against

a foreign

part ici pa ti on in any
power virtua ll y

imp os ible . 44
0

Thus confronted

with the dile mma of searchin g for

44Taylor , Foreign

15, 1938), 278-79.
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60
ays of cau sin g Japan to dei st while

effect ive

t he ,oose vel t ~dministration

i nvolved,45

tr ad iti onal polic y of i nsisting
American
effe ct,

ri ght s an d intere

resorted

and a ctive

upon pro per res pect f or

ts in China .

This was , :in

ies on the China mainl and,

and activit

interventi

on to protect

th em,.

On July 16, 1937 , Secret ary of State
forma l press

release

in whic h he repeated

which he ha d ext olled
upon all

nati ons to faithful

P it hou t special

t rea ties.

Ja pan , he declar'ed

all

equality

that

issued ·a

l y observe

office.

opportunity;

He

i nt ernatio nal

of

of th e san ctity

re feren ce t o ei th<~r China

nat i ons th e «ap plicrtion

of treatment.

into

or

sought Hef.fec-

the United States

of com.me
rcial

Hull

the prineiples

since his entrance

agreement s and to upho l d the principle

tive

to the

a compromise polic y betw ee n t he compl ete abandonnen t

of America n interests

called

sta ying un~

n

and urg ed upon

of the princi pl e of equality

n46

Thi s rvas diplomacy

in a nau ghty world .

by

orality,

a. fl ic k<.~rin ca ndle

"In pur e ri ....,
hteou sncs s it

Stimson polic y of 1932.n47

It expressed

outdid

an attitud

the

e rather

45F
··
. e1.s,
p. 10 •
46u. s. Department of State, faee rs Kel ating to the
Forei gn Rel at ions of the Unite d St ates: Ja pan I' 1-1 1 f
Washin gto n : United States uov er nment Pr i nting Offi ce,
1943), 326. (Cited hereafte r a s Forei gn Relations:
Japan,
1931-1941.)
4 7nonald F . Dru.romond, The Pa ssi ng of' American
Neutr;ality,
1937-1941 · {Ann Arbor: 'lqhe University of
) ic i gan Press,
1955}, p ,. 53~

61
than a policy,
apparent .
tict.

Its

severe

But existing

conditions,

re imented aga inst

policy

at that

ti me.

limitations

expression

1.f th~ United

re assertion

of the Open Door an d :tts attendant

of f-er resistance

of national

to withdraw

tre aty

concerns

the resu mption

of the United States

cf hostilities

was the

presen ce of some 12,0 00 Americans in Chi na ,

and his cabinet

mi ght result
serious

if

feared

Americ an lives

fig hting

·were lost.,

these

consi derabl e dispa tc h .

to ass ist
of removal,

Dip lo matic and consular
of the

ment ordered

evacuation~

Se·c:ret,ary Hull

1937 to a pp ro priate

to

Washingt .on acted

Americans,

to u,r g e citi zens

in this

that

Shan gh ai

to t ho se Americans

'l'he outbreak

United

~-500,0 00.

li200
in order

of f icials

Stat.es

'to le(;lVe

and where possible

To fae:i.litat~
sked

with

Congress

t his proces s
on August

17,

At t.he same tt me, the

'""Overn-

marine s loc ated at San Die go be
~o g ive

more

adequat

remai ning in the area

e pr otection

of thoaa

prepa ring

48Ibid .
·

49Taylor,

15 , 19 38 ) , 2 83 •

of

acute.49

zorn:~s as qui ckly as possi blet

t h e danger

whi ch

around Shanghai in the f 11 of 1937 made

To sa.fequard

were ordered

Both the

the re,Percussions

the pr oblem of ade quate protection

sent

Many of thes e

were in areas w,ieh were unde r attack,

President

c ould

expa nsion~sm in the Far Eas t.4 8

One of the foremost

persons

, and t h e

one way in ·which the a:dmini st ration
to Japanese

Government after

and domes ...

could not move

lea ...t it

seeme d. the

decline

States

forward _, at

rights

too

both foreign

any firmer

could

were all

Foreign

Policy

Rep~rts

J i!II

(February

62

·to de part.50

Inf antry

eipin g and Ti entsi.n

nine river
Yarnell

and mar ine detachments

iss ued a st ate ment in late

to pro t ect Americans

Durin g t h e first
the United

protect

St a tes

American

had pur osely
1937 to the
act,

months of h osti'lities
eff ort

President

when
to

Roosevelt

from a plyin g the Neutr ality

1ar in China . 53

Under the provisions

Act of

of thi s

a prero gative

of the Pre-side _nt to deter-

te of war existed

bet ween t wo countries.

decl

The isola t ionist

red

tb. Eit

t .10

or more

auto matic ally

arc hitects

powe rs were at

a

be can1e operative

.

ct had t hus

i nto a con-

States

was not re sp onsible.54

The President's

rea s ons for not calli ng the

Act i nto effect

were twofold .

First

50Forei gn Relations:
Japan , 1931-1941,
51Gris wol d , p. 461 .
52Tayl or , I<'_
orei gn Poli cI Reports, XIII
.
1938 ), 2S4.
53Feis, p ..- 10.

54Taylor,

war,

of some "incidentrt

occurrin g vhich wou ld dra w t he United

f or whic h it

lf

and munitions

of the Neutra l ity

ho ped to eli min ate the possi bility

193 8 ), 280.

would

in Ch i na.5 2

r emained

and pro perty,

to bel li gerents

Neutr a lity

fleet,

t., at the fleet

and i mparti a l embar go upon loans

mandatory

f lict

Asiatic

Admiral

acce pt any ttnecessary

who still

several

refrained

mine when ant
he formally

i·l OP l d

t

Govern ment was maki ng every

lives

1a s left

it

ex ports

St a tes

September

not be wit hd ra wn a nd t ha t it

risktt

waters . 51

cruisiri g in Chinese

, co m.ma
_n d er of t h 0 United

at

du ty , ns were the

were ke pt on active

gunboats

stationed

r oreign

Policy

R£;:ports,

III

, by

I , 350.

{February

15,

(Febru ary 15,

6.3
.

a pp lyin g the

h e wold

a ct to t h e Sino - J ap anese

--......

c onflict

..:
, h e sm.1 th a t

be h el pin g Ja pan and hurtin g China .

If Ameri can

ves s els tlere pre vente d f ro m carr yi ng materials
the two belli ger ents,

of war to

no pa rticul ar ha r dshi p would be

worked upon the Ja p'nese

who had no shorta ge of' weapons .

howev er, wou l d be le f t virt ua lly

The Chi nese,

de fe nseless.

if t h e Ameri can Government de cl are d China and Ja pan

Second,

to be at war--a

conditio n wh ich the gover nments

of both

had not acknowled ged to ex:i.st ---i t mi ght prov e

countries

re ,;.;
rett ab le .

11

t han an i n cident.

Names count;
tt

a war mi ght be hard er to end

55

There wa s also

th e possi bility

th at a neutr a lity

procla rn tio n mi ght le ad to a f or mal declaration
t ween t he t wo belli eer ent nations .
t h e r ules

ident

there

would be left

prot ec tion _.56
under

If Japan t hen invoked

of war and dema nded t h e ·dthdrawal

for ces of al l t hird parties

h'i t h out t he sli ghte s t vesti

g es gra nted

on e st.op fa r ther

by internatio

n al

China.

Ja panese
would

Despite

I f Ameri c a n mer chant

vess e l s were

ng whe r e recri .nina.tions

the very real

mi gh t beco me i n volved

possibility

that

mi ght

sto pped by

11;.
1938 ), 281.
/)

57ttull , I , 558.

there

end . 57

the United

i n a forei gn war as a direct

55Fei s, P• 10.
56•raylor , Forei gn Policy . Reports,

and,

to trade

vra r shi p s and car goes se iz ed or destroyed,

b e no telli

ge of

lm·r in tirn e

of war , challen ge the ri ght of the Unit ed States
with

armed

of the

fro m Chin a , the Ameri cans res-

Ja pan mi ght go still

t he privile

of war be -

Stat es

1"esult

XI I I ( February

64
of i mposin g t he Neutra l ity
never

tired

of denou ncing

Act,

Americ an is ola tionists

Pre si 1ent Roosev elt

for hi s fail-

ure to apply the measu re .
As it

was ,, t h e danger

shi ppi ng in the western
istr ation's

Pacific

..

authorities

Japanese

the admin -

On August 25 , 1937, the

that

of proper

shi p-

For ei gn merc hantm en were not
naval

The fo llowi ng da y , howev er , Japanese

declared

purposes

Ameri can

proclai med a blo ckade aga i ns t Chinese

pi ng alon g the China coa st .

for

al most forced

hand on t his issue .

Ja an e se fleet

mentioned

of j_nter feren ce with

f orei gn vessels

identi f ic at io n .

mi ght be boarded
Furth er more , th e

Governm en t reserve d t he ri ght to con f iscate

vessels

carr yin g car goes th a t in ti me of war would be con -

sidered

contr aban d . 58

t a l bombing of the
flier

led Admiral

nly a. f ew da ys later•

u. s . s.
Yarnell

at Shan ghai.

of the

United

Thes e even ts in Asian \:mters
11hen isolat

i onist

a g overnment-o

nineteen

pla ne s destined

shi ps

for th e advocates

of

States'

. 59

neutrality

occ ur red at the very

grou ps i n th e Unit ed States

f ocusi ng t h e publ ic attention
it ic h ita.,

Ch inese

Su ch a r ap id su c-

were fr esh tinder

an i unedi a te declaration

mo 1ent

by a

to 1.-:arn Ameri can merchant

to . ke no furt he r e alls

ce s si on of in ci dents

Pres:i,dent Hooyer

t h e acciden•

upon the

wned vessel

for

were

sai lin g of the

carr yin g e. ca r go of

the Chinese

Govern ment.60

Wit h an eye toward rec ent happeni ngs in the Far East,
58Taylor , Foreign
15, 1938) , 2$0 .

Policz

Report~,

XII I (Febr uary

59I bid ~, p . 284 .

60 B:i,.sson, Amer•ican

Policy

in t he Far East.,

p . 61.

65
See-retary of Stat e Hull announce d on August 27 that

tie

United

behalf

States

and on behalf

Govern ment rese r ved all rights
of' i.-~s national

s for

or pr operty

sustained

American lives
military

. 61

a cti vities

re ply .

The Mini

damages to· or lo ss

that

a s a result

United

contention

i n an effort

of th~ Japanese
for

co mnensation

the

Government that

in Toky o

by nationals

damage or loss

On that

was not to be

I bid .,

, elations:

of t h ird

to look to Japan
was eA'J)e r ienc ed by

same d-ayt however , the
ves$els

o,1rn:d by the

Govern ment wer ·e no lo · ger pe r mi tted

6 11roreign
62

it

would continue

Preside nt &lll'lo~ ce d t hat merchant
Sta tes

a ut ho rities

darnages sustaine~

whenever

America n s in China . 64

United

to forc e the

14, 1937, Se cret ary Hull in structed

partie s .. The United States
for

With this

State ,s Governm.errt co ul d not a cce pt the

responsible

held

of third

brou ght even great er pressure ·to

A>nba-s
s ador Jose ph Grew· t.o inform
the

ls

eff ect.63

Act into

On September

that

by nationa

in Ohina . 62

f i ghting

of -the

up on the · ad.minis tr ation

Neutr a lity

Ja pane se

the gove rn ment of Japan was not

announcemen t , neutralists
bear

of Japane se

Four days la te1 "' ca me the

li ab le f or damages or l1c.:sses suffered

pa rties

as a result

of

of Forei gn Affair s, Ko-coHirot a,

ter

informed Washington

on its

. J_aQan, .J..221-19l1:l,

to carry

I, 490.

p . 492.

6 3The pl an es aboard the Wi chi ta were subsequen tl y
or d-e red unl oaded at .San Die go, Cali.f or n ia .

'l'hey f i nal ly

found t h eir way to Ghina. via Eur ope.
64-Foreign 1;,ela t io n s: Ja pan , 1931-1 241,. I, 497.

66
any sort

of war materials

pri va te A1-nie
ric an vessel
belli

Any

to eit her Japan or China.

of w r. to either

c arryin g a.rticles

geren t would hen ce f orth

proceed

at its

m,m ri

0

k.65

Since Americ -11 sh i ppers could engage in carry:i..ng
war materia ls to · Japan at virtu
declaration

oosevelt
th a t

te s ts

throughout

1:l'
.

invoki ng one provision
'.was ctble -to t a.'ke the

co mi ng fr om the

d been

of the N0ut .rality

edge off

isol

statute

ha."'1 been in those

f irst

t.h e sha r -,p proi""'

camp

tionist

August and most of Sept ember,

t0 :i.nvoke the :neutrality
a s they

powers .

did not bear equa lly upon both warring

But by partially

ct ,

the Presi<ient•s

ll y no risk,

1937* Th e- demands

were never ag~in as strong
. t w·o mont hs of the und eclared

Sino ...Ja.panes e war.66
President
intense

Rooseve lt had successfully

pre esure

which. .the

br-ou ht to ·e ar upon hi m.

i solati~-,n ist-s

withstood

had t hu.:s far

He had persistently

refused

abandon Americ an citizens

and t he ir

the

J ap anese .- But the

t nder mercies

chief

exec utive

public

opinion,

it. ,

On October

o.f the

int eres ts

to

in Chi na to

office

of the

is such th at he mu st always seem to f ollow
or at le ast not go too .far out in front

5-, 1937; howeve r, Roo sevelt

unwritt en l aw in h is memorable
Ch ica g o; the

the

isola .tionist

Quarantine

v iol ated

ist

this

Speech at

ca pit a l of America .

such an upro ar from the non.i ntervention

o:f

It

ev ,ok~d

camp th at the

_______________________
________
_~adrnini st r ation. was for ced - to mak e, a hasty.,;..,_ retreat

65 Bi s son, Amerie an Policl

66I bid.

67 n,.,;1·
ey
Uc..,. - -

'

in the :F'ar-Ea·st,

p •· ·+•
J

. 67

p . 6 2.

,
67
The
address

0

resident's

Quarantine

whic h contained

the stron gest t hreat

action

again st Ja pan that

United

States . 6S

as a "contagion"

of coercive

had_ t nu s far been made by the

I n his addr ess,

Roosevelt

referred

and observe d th at a "quarantinett

communit y-' s usual

method of checking

of t he need f or '' positive

the world.69

Speech was a po1 erful

ef fortsn

to pt•eserve

His sug gesti on th at those

l awlessness

put in qua r antine

smacked sharply

of some sort

hinte d th at t he President

pe ace of

infected
should

be

of embar go,

had Japan in mind.

This was follo wed the next day by a press
Depart ment of St a te which concurred

He spoke

the

nations

of international

timing

was t,he

an epidemic.

with t h e epidemic

.and its

to war

release

fro m th e

with the Lea gue's

de-

ci s ion t ha t Ja pa n had viol at ed both t he· Ni ne- Power Tr eaty
and the Kello gg-Briand. Pact by its

unwarranted

attack

upon

China.70
The President's
a s a surprise

for ce ful

atti t ude at Chicag o c ame

to the Americ an public,

His harsh tone

crea t ed alarm among a l ar ge se gment of his f ello w country ...
. men, and most Americans

ge sti on .

The pro posal

ra d ic al a de pa rture
fore i gn affairs.
t he rest

ed hi s nquar antinett

had come too abrup tl y; it

fr om t he President's

past

A few grou ps rus he d t-o his

of the nation

were opp osed.

reject

sug ...

was too
on

co 1m
nents

su pport,

but

and most of the members of Congress

Psycholo gi cally,

6 6rraylor , For eign Policy
.
15, 1938) , 280.
69Quigley , p . 212.

the country
Reports,

was not
XII I ( February
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I

pre pared for such a st atemen t an d ·was unwilli n
United · St ates

could not reaeh

t hem elves,

in i nternati

convi nced tha t the

Americ ns ,·rere still

p olitics.

ide mic"

to ado pt a more vi gorous role

f or th e

t hem.

ffTh ey preferred

onal

nep -

to isolate

than jo in in an un cer tai n ef f or t. to wipe

rather

out t he disease.n71
Presi dent Roos evelt

i mmedi at ely realized

had gone too far,

too fast.

t he day follm ·rin

hi.s Chica go speech,

to amplify
best

At a press

his re marks of the previous

on Octo ber 7 whether

anythin

conference

h eld on

the President

refused

day , frustrating

the

of ne smen to draw hi m out on th e su bj ect.

efforts

Vfhen th e Ja panese Ambassador , Hirosi
Hull

th t he

s ecif i c

n mi nd ,

Saito,

as ked Secretary

t he United St ates

Govern ment had

ull. st ate d that

no action

was

conte mpl ated f or t re time be in g .72
'l'his

followed

sio n by t he American

act Ii

by a ssura nces fr om Gre at Brit

shortly

disci plin ary a ct ion against
that

qua rte r,

announced purpose

th e Nine- Power Conference

no

that

whic h had

on Octo ber 30, 1937.

The

of th is meetin g was to fin d a pea ce £ul

t he crisis

in Ch ina.

Fr ance and Great Br itain,

preoccu pied ".vi.
t h 1,..rorsening conditions

infor med t h e United

tates

p. 12.

in Euro pe, ha d

i n advan ce that

hav e to t ake the le ad i n effecting
71 Feis,

i n that

Ja pa n wa s bei ng contemp l ated i n

bee n summoned to meet at Brussels

0£

of St te,

rornpt ed the Ja panese to give ~otice

they would not attend

solution

Secretary

as hin to n would

any such "quarantines"

72 Drummond, p. 62.

69
in the Far East as t he President
unreadiness

envis:i.oned . 73

of the Ameri can public

The obvious

f or co er cive ste ps on

the one hand and the gove rnment's

un.:.rillingness

to rm-·-mrd

Japan 's aggr es s ion in China on the ot her complet e ly hamstr ung th e Americ an delegation,74
The confer ence,
futile

sent

.

under th ese circumsta nces,

Japan , one of th e parties

f rom t he pro ceed1.ngs.

not take the lead against
not .

It ende d after

reiteratin
Ch ina,

g t h eir

three

to the di spute , was ab -

Fran ce and Great Brit ain would
J apan .

The United dtates

concer n for the territorial

The t otal

s cored by Tokyo's

failur

defiant

n o i nterf ere n ce by third
On

Ja pan ese aviators
Pana y .

i nte grity

a si milar

of

sentiment

e of ~he conf'e:r ·ence was un der-

ann ounce ment that,
part ies

it

would brook

po lic y i n Ch i na , 75

'its

i1rlth

ec0mbe:r 12, 1937, t he most

sin ce the outbreak

could

weeks wi.th the democrat ic st at es

but not in g was done to inst.ill

i n Ja pa n:.

proved

seri ous in cide nt

of t he Sino-Ja panese war occurred
bombed and sank the Unite d

The Panai had been e s corti ng three

when

t'tes

gunb oat

Sta nda rd Oil

Company t ank ers down t he Yangtze River when t he attack
oc cu rred

so me twenty

miles

up ..river

cumstan ces s urro undi ng the attack
provocation

, sin ce th e nationality

ank i ng .

from

sug ested
of all

'l'he cir-

deliberate

the vesse ls was

clearl y des i gnat 0d by mean s of l ar ge ensi gns and painted
73Gris wold,

PP • 459-60.

74,ra yl or , Foreign
1 5 , 19 3 8 ) , 2 $6 •

Pol ic y Rep orts,
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75Joh n Mor ton Bl um, From the Mor ~enthau Diarie s:
Years of Crisis , 1928-19~ 8, I (Boston~
Houghton l\fifflin
Co.~ 1959}; P • 462.
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The survivors

flags .

of ·the initial

fr om the sinking

unned as they escaped

.Pana.z had been momentarily

:from r my motorboats.
three

all

of indi

result

of repeated

'"'ir attack,

and many others
there

the public

forces

On Capitol

the necessity

of peaceful

work o ta.

favorinrr

the

f r o n t he area

ctory

,dn g the

of New Jersey

sent

affected

States

the

to

settlement.?$

bombine , Senator

a l eJcter

by the

illiam

to Secretary

c onf1.j_ct .

H.

Hull

and vessel s

In his

reply

of

for s evera l

in variou s oc cupat.ion s and act i vi t ies .

along with

h d aGcevted
~

various

off from the interests

He

governments,

t.he United

-

and incurred

various

rights

as the present

could not suddenly

??osgood,

78u. s., Congressional
Record,
1937, LXXII, Part 2, 1968.

ob~

situation

cut the 1sel ve s

of a life~tim e , nor could the •

76lbid . , I, 485.

ed

other

As fil le d with danger

mi ght be, many Americans

Sess.,

upon

Ameri cans had gone to China and had establish

out that,

lig::1tion s.

of

than

impressed

removal of a l l American c i tizens

themselv es there
pointed

rather

calm so th·t

Dece1ber 18 , Hul l remind ed the Senat or that
generations,

vith 'raNal

would have an opportunit.y

quick and satisfa

S athers

the

Congressmen

of remaining

arbitration

The day follo

for

increased

Hi l l,

wounded . 76

·was only a momentary

and demands

American s from China actually

di rnini~hed . 77

and the
pers onne l

States,

nation,

ships,

by Japanese

As

In the United

were machin e-

boarded

AmAricans were killed

outbur~;t

attack

p. 404.

75th Cong., 2nd
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American

Government suddenly

abando n its

obli

ations

and

responsi bilities.79
This
moral

reiter

of t he discord

by the

off icers

considerable

debat e within

the steps

th at t he attack

i ndication
China. 80

Rooseve lt's

cab i net concer ning

had been del ib erate,

of Ja pan 1 s desire

to f orce all

si mply another

v est erne rs from

Vice~ Presi dent Garne r t hought that

was confident

at s ea., a move su pported

Admiral

by the

st aff , however,

could bring

Willia m Leahy , Ch ief
be prepared

~resident's

Nor man H. Davi s,. and by Assi st ant S·ecretary
Moore.

Roos~velt,

th at economic sanctions

of Naval Operation s, ur ged t ha t the f leet

tlalton

only a show of

upon the Ja pan ese.

Ja pan to t er ms withou t war. gl

action

There had been

and the Secret ary of St ate be-

f orce would hav e any ef fect
however,

Panax crisis.

among ad-

to be ta.ke n if dip lo macy f ai led to solve the cri-

Both the President

lieved

nal agree ment,s gave no in-

whic h had been produced

mi nistr ative

si s.

atio n of the United States'

duty t o uph ol d internatio

dication

•

rosaic

f or

adviser,

of St a te,

R.

The Presi dent and othe r members of his
resisted

any suc h provocative

a ction.S2

Se cre t ry of the Tr easury , Henry Mor gent hau , consistently
t h e advo c at e of more .f orcef ul measu res a gainst

79r ul l,
.I cke s,

Japan , was

I , 565 .

aoHarol d L. Ickes , The Secr et Diarx of Harold L.
( New Yorik : s · on &. Schuster,
1954), p . 275 •
82~ eumann , p . 15)
$l Bl um, I, 4$9.
. .•
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qui tc wi . li n

to

o to

far ov er the

st re. sis ed h is

pprehen s:l.on that

co nti nue u .•oppos ed, t here
:i.n t 1.e Paci f ic..
it

f&n;ay i s su e.

Ja pan w :re

if

.ll ot'ie d t o

wou l d :>e n o end to its

Hi s ass i s t n t,

w.y:ne

Taylor,

ad vances.

r e l ied t ha t

,,.rou d be Hcoc k ey edn t o r i sk •·•ar ov$r s uc h

n 1.ss u e, $3

1

Such was the

IIe

egree of divi s i on wi t hin t l e admi nJstr

tion .

"'her e w"s , h a pil y erwtgh ,, no o ccasio n .for a ction .
The J a p- n e s e Gov er nment ha ot ene d t o r.na.ke th e ..Jo st effu sive

of apo lo gi e s , pro mi s ed to

ay t he i nd ernn jJ_,ies a.sked

f or by

gave r enewed as sur ances of res pe-ct for

t he Unit ed St tes,

Amer i c n r i ghts and in t ere sts i n Chi na, an ' i ndic ated -that
the

_· 1ita r y of f icers

re s ?on s ib le f or t he

ized

att a ck ·would b e pv.n ished.

St tes. Gove r nment of f ici a lly

holly

unauthor-

On Dece .;1be r 23, the

acce pted

United

t h e J· p~ne s e ~.polo gy,

and by Christm a s Day , 1937, t he m tt ar wa s eon ~ide r ed
0

closed. t 4
Appr e:e nsio n amon~ America n off ic i al s continued
eve n af t er t he Pan~
s olved.

The J p

i nctde nt had bee n sati sfa ct orily

-ese m:tlit ary, vhic h had

1

re-

one much to

prov oke t he war in Chi na, lta l r eve aled a bra zen disrega rd
J':'or American

i nter e sts .

or eo-ver, h d f a iled
t h e at t a ck .

The ci vil

a

.u or i ti

e s in Toky o,

to make the milit ary admit

its

part

The t hre ats whi ch t his dang ero u s s itu·· ti on

.

in
.

po s ed f or t .h e fut ure , ere r e c ,:,n i zed by A.mba ss ! 'or Gr:ew.

Dece mber 26 , 1937, h e wrot e:

On
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War between Ja pan a nd the United States wil l not come
through mere interference
or even destruction
of our
tan gible

i n terests

in Ch i na ; or yet

f t•om the breach

0£

treaty ri ghts, or t he breakin g down of princi ples for
wh ich •rn stand, but war may very easily co me from some
.further act in dero gation of American soverei gnty. • • ,
Theret n J.ies t he dan g er an •:l it is a re a l dan ger wh ich
no one with knowled e e of the irres ponsibility
of th e
Japanese military
as distin guished fro m the Japanese
Government

can eliminate

from the

future

The anomaly of undecl a red though

provi ded a le gal basis

governments
nationals

for di plomatic

keenly

interested

i estern

powers

efforts

economic investments
in . ro motin g joi nt

in defense

a multilateral
States

of treaty

foreign

r.

preferred

to retain

and without

reference

minish

Ameri ca's

aversion

effort

was made to prevent
to the point

,

in China, was
ction

rights.

among the

The Am~rican

to any sugg estion

underta kin g anywhere in the world .

Ja pan was careful

irritated

by

warfare

the lives

Government , however , was not receptive

dependently

unli mited

and pro p erties 0£ their
wit h in the war zones of China. 86 Great Britain
to protect

with .its extensive

United

pictu re~ ,e5

of

The

to a ct in ...
to any foreign ally" 87
its

ability

to do nothin g which would difor colle ctive
the United

l1here

measures,.,

States

Every

from becoming

it would seek to make common

ca use with

Great Britain against the ambitions
of J ap an in
of preventin g Angl o--Americ an
East Asia . 88 In the interest

85Joseph
Simon & Schuster,
86Quigley;
$7'l~ay lor,

c.

Grew, Ten Years in Japan (New York:

1944) , p . 246.
p . 213 ,.

For_.§ign _PoliCI

15 , 193 8 ), 284,
,
86Grew1, p. 244.
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coo perati on in the Far East , Ja
occu ied

reas

nese authorities

of China were · c on sistently

of Americ an than British

rights

di plomacy occurred

in an effort

Affairs

matter

the

th e Japanese

the

steps

whi ch had been issued
be exercised
v0ssels

were located,

strate

gi c adva.nta.ge.n
to military,

to give greater

and interests

terests

to prevent

a

instru ctin g that

the gr eatest

"even at the sacrifi

or

ce of a

ri gid orders"

11

had b een

nav 1, and Forei gn Offi ce authorities
to the instructions

givenn against

of the United

t aken , the Japanese
ascertain

s in

'rh e note cite d nava l

In addition,

attention

been ttre peatedly

of Forei gn

in area s where Ameri can warships

other

issued

At the

Minister

t hat had been taken

recurren ce of su ch an "ac cident ..."

caution

States~

a not e to American representative

presented

orders

b efore ~ popular

up in the United

of the crisis,

Tokyo outlining

ele ment in

at the time of the Pana¥ crisis.

to settle

antagoni sm could build
conclusion

of this

to meet the demands ·of the Depar tment of

Tokyo had rushed
State

solicitous

. 89

A most st ri king manife station
Japanese

, ore

in the

which had

inter f erence

States

4

with the ri ght s

St eps had

lready

been

Forei gn Offic e conc lude d, to more · fu lly

t h e location

of American

nationals

and their

in-

.in China . 90
Thro ugh out 193.7 and 1938,- the weste rn powers made

89Tayl or> i-l'
oreign
15 , 1938 } t 2$5 .

90Foreign

Relations:

Policy Re:gorts,
Ja pan

1

Xl~I (Februa r y

1931-1 9{±1, I,

550 .
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only

parallel

ri gh ts

rc i1:res entati

by th e c1rmed f .orces

I mperi· l J""pa.n .
action

on s ,.ga.i ,. t vi ol ation s of tre-ity

by the

Mo real

and. adr; inistra.tive

agen t s of

cooperati ve effor t involving

gov e rn mE>.n
ts of Gr oat Brita in,

•r2ince,

joint
and th e

mid-1 939 . 91

United , St at es ,;, ould occur w1til

Thr oughout 193H, the Depart ment of St "te dispa tched

a serie"'

of

i .Lomatic

notes

to the author ivies

rote s ,i ng a,a i nst J ap nese .maltreatment
· zen s in China, the seizure
freezin

of t heir

of A eric :on busines

g o·t

..Japane s e mon opol i e s . 92

pro pert ies , and the

s by the

the

of

of protest$

s a r esult

Su ch vi >lat i on s of Am.eri ccm ri

cons t ~nt subj.-:-ct of h is

•'ore i ...,n. Af fairs

es t abl i qhment of

of a consta nt flood

fro m Americans who had s ff ered injury
,var.

of Americ _ cit-

J ose ph Grew, the .Ameriean Ambass ador

to Japan ,, w s t he recipient

Sino-Ja pa nese

in Tokyo

c onvers at io n s with

the

of the
ht s were
-lin ister

. 93

onths of' 1938, th e subject

In the l as t six

of

A eri c ' n ri s:r t s in Chin a. ·was dis cu ssed with

increasi

q ency by AmericG:n and Ja

The month o.f

July wa$ narked

y th

untiring

to obta i n Ja pan 's r espect
wld ch exi st ed in China.

t

.e hours

Affa irs,

nese officials.
efforts

of Am.b·:ss or Grew

f or the divers e .Ame
rica n i nt erests
,. n Ju l y 4 , Grew p sse d nearly

in co nf er enc e rith

expl or in- the ent ire

t h e ll.d.ni r.;t/:)r of ro r ign

fie l d of Americ an interests

9l Bisso n , American ..E2],.icy i n ·the_•ar

9 2t1ull , I, 569 .

n · f re -

93arew, p . 266 .

East , pp . 8£,- 89.
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in Chin"'.

The .Japanese Gov~rnment

St ates that

American

assured

t h e United

ri ghts would not b-e curtailed.94

treaty

In early October , Ambassa ~or Gre w presen ted to the
.Japanese

Foreign

Office

a bill

been dr wn up at Pres i dent
statement,

the

assurances

by the

American

J,panese

t- ken to

been im_ ose d upon areas

control;

(2) sus"end

whi ch served to deprive
imat e share

and other

America n trade
Affa .irs,
i ving

frstea

by Japanese

:r-ights,

fa tl y

!tl'

The

.i . Chin.a;

le git-

( 3) d isAmerican

with

restrictionn
ctin g Minist.,er

replied

c l!3s th,;i,t the

intained

practices

authorities

including

con-

under

P..meriean nat:i.onals of their

<':Indshi 1 p in g .

assuran

exchange

any monopo listic

ri n c~ Fumimaro Konoye,
fu ll

tha

measur es be

of vhina

of the tr a de ana. indufitry

continu e i.n.terference
pr operty

currency

i'he

so frequently

pe ci fi cally,

( 1) end the discrirainatory

whi ch l'rd

Ja.pan's

00

th~ assurances

pro . . t and effective

that

of'

in China had pe rsisted.

now asked that

requested

President

Ir.1 t h is

Gove.rm:nent, vio l ations

and interests

had

desp i te repe ated

out that

:Ln t e pas t be i mplen1ented.

given

trol

~oosev elt' s re que st.

Preside ·nt pointed

rights

United St tes

of parti c ul ar s ,irhieh

upon
of Porei gn

by once. again

Open Door in China

•:muld be

. n95

On Novemb r Zl,

l ong conver~r ti on occurred

bet :reen

the American Ambassador and the newly desi nated

orei gn

Aff a irs

i mme diate.

·nis te rt

Hachiro

lrita

.

Grew asked

that

94Grew, pp . 251-,52.
9 5Fore:Lgn , Relat1.9q _s: . tla p a,n, ,). 931-191+1, 1 781 - 5.
1
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step -s be t ak en to hal t the

ir

troying

and mission·ry

American commercial

cated in are a s often
o erations.
constan tly

clearly
these

attacks

showed .

were taking

attacks

re .' ortsn

into

pouring

-of these

because

depredations

He a lso

-.tt

of t h

Am~rica.n trade

nd shi ppin g , since Japanese

Yan tz~ River

The American Govern ment ur ge ·d that

further

of t:ruth

res ponse to this

Japan desired
materia ls,

t hat

the

this

to

mercha ntmen

up and down the

river.

discrimination

be

of American co .orce in

1

in the allegation
in areas

d only if conducted

Ambassador to

asked

if there

Grew asked the Forei gn Minister

Ambassador

tr ad e with China w0uld
tolerate

volu me and

delay . 96

~1t h re gard to the future

was any element

0

that

be made ac cessible

were openly engaged in co mmerce both

China,

the Embassy

of t,he

lo wer s.tretches

ended without

pla ce

He rejecte d the Ja panese explanation

outrage s were accidental

constancy

lo-

properties,

far removed from the .scene of military

l'h ese unwarranted
a s "daily

whi ch were des-

inquiry,

that

American

under Ja pan ese control,

be

thro ugh Ja panese middle men.

In

Arita

aut horized

the American

ive SecrGta.ry Hull a "c ateg orical
and i ntended to assurt1 for itself

th-e Ja panese Minister

be a very l ar ge and probably

confided,

increasing

denial.n
certain

but '1 there
field

for

raw
would

American

tr ade and ot er enter prise.n97
Su ch artifi

ce and dissimu

lation,

96Grew1 P • 257.
97Forei gn Relcations : Ja pan,

however,

could

1921-1941, I, 807.

no
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longer

conceal

Ja p~..n's

bitiion

to eli min a te all

ft •o. the China mainl!':lnd .

comrnerc~

for~ign

Only thr ee days

before

A.rita 's conversa ti on with Gr ew, t he Ja an~se Government had

nnoun eed t1 a t it

in te n e

p rinci ple of eq uality

n.ale the ob~erv ance of the

to

of oppo rtunity

u >on t e acce pt nee by t h e United

p owers o.f

c:i 11new

order"

t he se a s surances
i.f'ieations

.:.::>t
a tes

an d the

other

in ·,•, st Asia. 98

As 193 8 drew to a close,

assuran ces concern:in

in Ch i n a ccmditional

1'okyo co ntin 1ed to ~ive

t he futu re of t h e Open Door , but

were increasin

gly Sllrrottnde

as to ma k e t ' em virtually

by such qu.al ...

mea nin gl ,~ss. 99

On

December JO, 1'.\.mbasador Grew hand ed the Ja panese Govern ment
-the la.st

di plo matic

note of the yec:.r.

Grew r eit er ated t he Americ an

principle
ject

of commercial

to nul li fication

J p n.

In t h l.S mes s.age,,

ov ermon t's

position

th at the

opportunit y in China was not $Ubby uni1 ateral

Th e Unit ed States,

action

on the part

t he mes t•ag e con cluded ,

acknowled e or consent to

'l!'
TOUld

of
not

y i mpa1.l"m~nt of it . treat.y

ri ght s. 100
T e Open . oor,
mere wor d s.

Tne represeritation

on beh alf of American
little

co u ld not be h eld
s ma de by .American

commercia l interests

ild e by
di plomats

in China did

more t han amass clc>1irns ag i . t t he J p nes e

Govern ment.
treat

ho •10ver,

Grew believed

th t i nterfe r ence ilith

Auerican

y ri ght s would end only when t he Ja pan ese wer e given

9Brbid.

100 rbi

, p.

1

!;

00.

., pp . $20 ...26 .

-

99!bid.,

pp . 814-16.
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reason

to be lie ve t ha t the United

more than

talk .101

St.ates

mt gh t

o something

Subsequ ent ev ents wer e to prove him

ri ght i n t his jud gement;.

beyond lay _ahead.

2,~.

101
· · a rew , p . - r.,..

Onl y •the gri mmer days of 1939 and

BO

CHAPTER IV

TH• I p_ CT O

AMERIC ·J C01I?l 'RGIA,, I NTE' ES'l1S ON

lTNI'l'...m "'T T s

Comm
ercial

Ai AS ., ,;ss M.EN
T

OLICY:

Intere

ts in Relation

to

Factors

Majo r Political

Then Ja pan i nva de d the Asia n mainla nd in 1937,
Americ an busines smen i n Chi na i nsi sted that
St ates Gover

ent

"rovid e the f u1lest

sel v s and fo r their

inve s t ment$.

the United

pro te ctio n f or them ...

This d emand was base d

s uarel y upon the gu ar antee s embodied wit h i n the doctrin e
of t he Open Door , an av owed pol:Lcy of t h e Uni t ed ....t at.es

~overru nent sin ce th e first
With

day s of t he t wentiet

t he pro mul ga tio n of th e

commercial
te grity
policy

oppor tunity

oor in 190 0 , equal it y o.f

en

wit hin China and th e t err itori al 1n ...

of Chi na had be come of f ici al objec tives
in t e F'ar Ea st .

Ameri c n citizen
t he ir

ce ntu ry .

s with

o.f America n
t ~en,

I t wa ~ onl y l ogi ca l,

t ha t

a f i nan ci 1 sta ke in Chi na ex p ec t ed

gov er nment to de.fen d the

--rri n ci ples

of the

Open Door

in the f ace of Ja anese i mperialis m.
The

$U

s qu ent

e.1.f,orts

of t h e United

Gov er nment to mainta i n the treaty
China mu s t n ot , ho ,-:eve r,

su c ces

St at es

ri ght s of its

n.;tio n als

be tak en as an i nd ic at io n of th e

whi ch the busin ess coro unity

en joy ed i n its

in

attempts

to prod Washi.n ton to.t~rd

of American

iness

intere

interests

Be ore t h e role

as s essed,

the

factors

States

of the policies

and attitudes

framework of United

in the general

States

and singleness

of purpose

ized American thou ght about the role
in Asia . 1
The basic

principles

have been '1 f~w., si mple,

the substance

Doctrine,

was ,p laced

in ~ff ect

two ideas

have enjoyed

American people.
level
fact

Fro m the

that

timately

both

of the United

policy

I n tho public

such oon$i~1tent

can largely

were conceived

of World War I!,
support

of as being

.Z

no

among th e

be attributed

assoc i ated with homeland security

1Neumann, p. 133.

mind,

nonen.tengle ment and

This firm a herence at the grass

policies

tntes

days ' :ihen the . .t onr -oe Do-etrine

to the eruption

of American ·society

acte,t ...

policy abroad has been em-

bo ied ih t wo fundament 1 concepts:
the 1-lonroe

r ather than.

of American foreign

of United States

with •

forei gn policy .

which has ch

and enduring . n

.

in

ambi guous positdon

Thi.s ambi guity was matched by the ambivalence
consisteney

relations

as i t found expression

China has a.h 1ay~ occu pied a r~ther

the

ri ghts in

whic h have been. of signif 'ic nee in Sino- American

The Open Door Policy

policy

Such an investigation

China must be tl1:orou.ghly explored .

must begin wit h an analysis

bus-

·: nieh motivated

to uphold American treaty

decision

defense

merican

tth ich

pl ayed in formulatin g Jnited

can be accurately

government's

ts .

a more spirited

roots
to the
in-

Until
with

t e Open ~Joor w s in

1900,

pr evailing

tie

equalit,

tone

of commercial

· as mt~rely

At the

Secretary

do or to j_nclude,

United.

St · tes

o.· th at b· si c A111e
rican

ti m of the Boxer
of ~t, ')te

not

forei i..>
n pol icy;

etery where i n the world

opportunity

an ex pr ession

fn ir pLay.
howe v r,

o

"' 11 c on s nance

only

John Hay had e:xt@nded the

commerci a l equality

Uni ted
of

By this

as well.

St a tes

under

en t in the

henceforth

powers .

with in the

impo~sible

mhe United

e;uar dian o_
American

hinese

shores .

St a te

of enforcing

the pro visions
It, wou ld have

a rr angem nts

3"'
.
Griswold,

an obli

It was, in fact,

lan ds had been
t,

1eoreti cal

ation

an obli g tion

far be yond
w

ich the

ha d no int ent ion of ful-

commercia l equality
t erritorial

:i.ntegrity

it

eg o t i a-te alliances

p . 7,

would

of the (pe n Door

had beco me the

soverei . ty,

of mutual

rn .Asia

American princi ple of

of the Open Door,
to

involve-

.3

If t he United St ates had entertained

pres erv in g China's

other

of East

l promul .i:;
ation

Americ an Go,1ernment app arently

f illin g .

nt , Hay p lac ed the

e af f air s of d istant

int

territorial

from s e rious

be virtually

in 1900, the traditional

v' ola.te · •

notion

:F'reedo

entan g le ments

noninvolvement

open

to preven t t h e dis menibero nt.

:.oli ti cal

With the offici
Doctrine

pronouncem

obli g ,:ition

by foreign

,h ina

in China,

1 bellion

Chines e Empire , but al s o res pect for China's
inte grity

n-otj~on of

any serious

in Chi.na or of
in a.cccr dan c e ·with

would ne ed assista
, under

nce .

tandir. g s , or

a~.vant 8 re w~ii ch ,rould

either

83
own lim i ted power or const r uc t a tr ust .rorthy

su pple ment its
po litic

a l substitute.

f orthc oming .

Such pr ovisions , however , wer e neve r
publ ic indiff er en ce to mat ters

Wides prea

yond American shores pr ecluded
steps

would be tnken

tant

privile

a.equi r e

a political

stake

in the dis-

quickly

~ast was too re mote from t he experience

Americ an s to genera te any a ctive
t eres ts in China.5

exhib ited

integrity

United

concern

States

st.ruck

beginn in g , then,

a r · th er hol lo w note in Unite d Sta.-tes foreign

never

exerted

ge to igno r e it.4

The Open Door has from the

Far

any

new tu rn i n na t iona l pol i cy,

west ern Paci fi c, the Ameri can people

their

that

which would se rv e to br ing nat;iona l

power in t o balan ce with this
Havi ng so abru tly

the poss i bility

be -

polic y .

The

of most

for Ameri can in--

offici a ls,

moreov er,

any deep concer n f or the i ndependen ce and

of Ch.ina bec ause t h ey f ully

realized

that

their

.fello w count ry men would not fi ght to uphold the Open Door
in an area ha lf- way around the
the Open Door was challenged,

limited

its

St ates

enever

Government

to reco gn ize a,ny agree ment or unde rs tanding

i\'hieh would i mpair

territorial

the United

1•

r es ponse to the si mple de cl a.rat i on th t it

would refuse

in China,

•mrld from them . 6

the treaty

ri ghts of American

or which would vi olat e the administr
inte gr it y of th e Chinese
4osgood.

p.

79.

6Bemis, Americ?n
? Bisson,

American

nation.7

citizens

ativ e or
This

5Neumann, P• 1J4 .
1i~oreig11 Pol,icy and Diplomacy,

i:. 457 .

Fore i gn Pqlic y in the _Fa,r E9-$t1 P• 12.

techni

ue had been emplo yed by Secret ary of State

J en n in g s Bryan

at, the ti me of the

Demands in 1915.
Manchuria

ot

It was to be used agai n by Secretary

in 1931-1932 •.

Beyond suc h diplo matic
United

Secre tar

of

d e le ga tion

re pro a ehes, however, the

were n ver will:i,.ng to go.

St at es officials

t;iroe of t he tra shington

tate · Charles

Evans Hughes tol d the American

t ha t the Uni t€d States

years latert

par t of Japan i n China.

President

China in defense
In sho rt,

nev er expressed

or Secr etary

of

still

of any

of St at e to send forces

to

of the Open Door. 8
the

Open Door t-tas ex pend ab le.

any vital

interest

It had

of the American people

As an economic document concerned

government.

commercial

opportunit y in a distant

resen ted a hop e rath er than a reality,

a policy .

could

ha.d u "neve r ente re d t h e head'"

'f en

tn

Elihu Root, who had served &s Secretary

wri te tha t it

or of their

go t,o war

' woul d never

tt

unde r The od ore Roo s ev el t {1905·-1909),

American

At the

I ava l Oonfere nce ( 1921-1922},

ov er any a ggress i on on the

with

no tori ou s 'l'wenty ...One

Hei:iry L, Sti mson when Ja pan ese armies overr an

Sta'te

State

\'illiam

en threatened

land,

it

rep ...

an i deal rather

by t h e depredation

than

s of some for-

ei gn power or combinat ion of vower s , t he United St at es had.
gi ven verbal
commercial

support ta the dua l princi ples of equality
opportunity

and the territorial

BNeumann
; p. 147

integrity

of

of
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China,

but th1t1re had neve r been any question

cf usi ng armed

f orce in de f en~e of the Open Door .
:Jhen Japan
in 1931

ttached
tre aty

d again

!l

no great
s·t ructure

it

ficial

rotest

in 1937,

tts

for th e Open Door

contempt

the United

States . Gover nment

imvor tan ce to the mai ntenan ce of the

American

10er s e.

with violations
sidered

i nd.i c ted

of the Open Door before

i mportant

had been faced

statesmen

and ha d never con-

enc gh t r:>·wa.rrant more than an of-

or a state ment givin g notiee

rnent of · existing

tr€a'ty

Japan t s. military

activities

that

r i .::hts would be reco gnized.
on t he Asia n continent

si gnal more than an inf r ingement upon America's
opportunities

ChJna's

Japan's

integrity.

in 1937, fo l low i ng only five

interpreted.

ci a-.ls as bu t the beginning

of a ge neral

fa ce of Asia .

en anger the security
disrt1 pt the

of A ericafs

to establish

i n China.

t he aggres s i on in
by

Americ an of'f i ...

i mp ri a li st ic drive

Paci f ic pos sessions
the

~

::tnd

shing ton Tr eat ies

in Eas t Asia.9

The concern of the United
any i mmedi ate

t oria l inte gri ty or the

of

oueh ambitio ns ·would u lt ima tel y

balan ce of p ower which

ha d attempted

transcended

commercial

assau lt upon Ghina

y ears after

ianchur ia , was increasingly

But
might

, somet hing even beyond the viol ation

territortal

a.-cross the

no abridge ...

Sta tes

r ega r d for

commercial

Gover nment t hus

eit he r China• ·s te rri-

i nte re sts

Wit h Japan t hreate ning to dominate

of Americans
the whole of

East Asia., it would have been impos si bly narrow fo r

etatesmen

Ameriean

to such li

t-o gear the

·te d ob je ctives

policy

of the

as t he preservation

equa lit y in China or t he administrative

The pri mary objectiv

f rom the time of th~

to Ja pan'~

St tes diplo macy

inci dent. throu ghout the

anchurian

i n the western

adventures

iuiperialistie

Pa ci.fie wi t hout at the same ti me embroiling
States

for

in war.

ways of ea.using

Sta tes

observ an ce of -e; e inte r nationally
wit h in t he doctrine

contain~d

li mit ations

existin

of 'SU.ch a purely

g circ umst ances,

ermnent'

s di sposal ~11

it

Fac ed with

Goverrun.ent eonclu ded that
g upon a strict

r eco gnized principles

of the Open

offic:i ..al.s w·ere under no delusions

whi le kee ping

be fou nd~lO

Japan only by insistin

could resist

in a search

Japan to desist

uninvolv ·ed, none could

t his dilemma, the llnited

the Unite d

·were ransacked

Altho ugh minds

effec .tive

the nation

it

of China ,

of the decade wa s to of f e~ some metumre of :re~is ..

re mainder

tance

of commer(l!ial,

integrity-

e of United

S.tates

United

oor.

American

-concern:i. ng th e gra.ve

mor tllistie

but w.-1de:r

fi>
Olicy,

was t he only means at the gov·rj_gh:ts of Amerie .an

By d e fend i ng the

nat io nal s in China , th e United St tes hoped to oustain
derly
In its

pro c esses

desire

acquisition.,

in th e spher e of interna

to hinder

Ja an's

t ional

efforts

relations

at territorial

the American Gover nment was often led to
P . l.O.

12 David H. Popper ttThe .'fest er n Powe1"s and t : e
Sino - Japanes e Conflict,"
orei gn Policy Report
s, XIV
.
( August 1, 193 ,.) , 120 ..
.

.
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di s play far more concer n ov~r Ch i a's er odin g sovereignty
than it

did interference
in Ch.ina . 13
'l'he Open Door

States

with

wi th Americ an eco nomic privileges

therefore

t

, provided

the means by whi ch it

Uni ted

hoped to deter

ex pans ionis m on th e Asian contine nt.
tel'·ests

were protected

and su stained

China's

administrative

and territorial

served

the

Japanes e

If commercial

in~

i n the meantime,
inte grity

if

were pre ...

along the way, so much the b et t er ; but th e first

ob-

je ctive

of American st ates men was to offe r some measure of

resisten

ce t o the predator y instincts

ar chy of interests

must b

by Ameri can comm
ercial

critical

ye ars bef ore

of J apan .

Thi s hie r ..

appre ci a t ed if t h e r ole pl ay ed

i nt erests
lorld

in China <lurin g the

War II

is to be pro perly

un der -

stood .

When J apanese ar mies

inva ded Chin a i n 1937, th e

American Government had wanted to a ssist
'fokyo' s eff orts

tionist
assistance

to extend the Empire .

sentiment

China in resisting
The pm'ilerf ul iso l a -

at home, however , had made any form of

, political

or economic,

virtually

i mpossible.

St i mson , i n 1931 , ha.d f ou nd the Ameri can people i n no mood
to depa rt fro m the nonentanglement
to take

fo r ceful

mea sures

covered

th at "the

policy

• had b een r ejected

aga i nst

tr adition;
the J apan ese,

of i mposin g san ctions

by Amer i ca in its

reje ction

he had want ed
bu t di sby for ce • •
of th e

Lea gue of Nations . nl4

13Taylor , Forei g11,Policy
15 , 193$ ) , 278 .
14sti mson , p . 244 .

Repol"ts,

XIII

(Febru a ry
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If' this
crisis,

mid-

was even more true

it

military

was true at th e time of the· Manchurian

of fensive

1 thirties;

when Ja pan lau nched its

China fi ;re years

against

again to take part in t h e quarrels

tries.

found elo quent expression

defeat

the mueh-deb a ted

illusion

coun ...

le gi sl ation

of

to ove1~1helming

oppositio

19.38 1 when the full
was barely

su.ff_cient

_to

Ludlow we.r-re.fe renr .um at"Uendm
ent ._16

thi .s gr im dete:t "mi n ation

from the virus

Fi rst

early January,

of administrative

Behind

never

The . peak of isol ati onis t:; stre ngth was

roba b y :rea.ch din
force

in response

By the

en tan g,lements

.in the neutrality

the year s 193 5-1937, passed

re .ssu:re.15

between foreign

to avo id foreign

This det ermination

public

resolved

Americans .hB.d firmly

most

later•

of ;forei gn wars

to iso l ate America

la :y th e feeling

of dis-

ment which had swept over the country
World War ... Th~ nation

had reacted

f ollowin g the

strongly

against

the Wilso nia n poli cy of exten siv e commit ments in the world
at large11

rolled

Both the period

across

the nation

econo mic depression
American attention
matters

..

of i mmense prosperity

durin g the 192-0's and the terrible

which followe d it
upon domestic

'rhos e who conducted

United States

t,.ihich

the

durin g the interwar

served to concentr ate

rather

than for eign

foreign

affairs

of the

perio d, while often

1 5William L. Langer ands. Everett Gleason , 'rhe
Challe n~e to Isolationis m, 1937-l940 {New York : Har per &
Bros., 1952) ," P• 14-.

16walter
Twenti.et,h

Millis,
Arms and the State
Century Fund , 1958), P• 17.

(New York:

The

.far a.head of public

opinion

i n the bread th of their

vision

I

and in their

~en se of the

ough t to play,

l ar er role

had ·to t ak e a ccount

fhu .s a li n e eame into

men fea r ed to cross.
national

b~nd itry

aro und the m.
national
states

felt.

mood

pre va iling

·

be in g whi ch American

They could deplore

states--

or inter-

t he act s

whicb. wer-e tak i ng pla ce in t he world

They could speak up in support

i l'lt er es ts . .
so zealously

But
desirin

·ith

the

pe ople

of traditional

of the

g pe,ac e , no Arneriean

fre e to take any act io n that

nation

of this

mi nd .17

whi ch had gr a sp ed the pub lic

vf1i ch t h e nati on

Uni t ed
off icial

mi ght pos si bl y earry the

Perha ps. t he cul minating

to ward or i nto war.18

expressio n of t he ut opi an ide a lis m whi ch characterized
st ate of the pu.b lie

' nd after

World War I came about with

the si gnin g of the Pact of Fari s :tn l at e August,
This

pact-.-which

breadth

was ae .leb:rated

the

a cross

the

1928 .

len gth an d

of the land ......had s ought to end war 'by the fatuous

device of maki ng it il le ga1.1 9
The r ,enewal of the . Sino-Ja pane se conflict

had put the paci f ist
in Congress

I

ele ment s into

and throu ghout

uati on of American
from Cb.in a.20

eountry

J. Hamilton

Isolattonist

d emanded the

civili an s and American

Senator

11Perkins,

the

cry.

iull

in 1937

evae ·....

armed force s

Lew.is of Illinois

pp . 2$4 ...85-.

19osgood, PP• 346--47
2'\a ymond t. Buell X:sala teg Ameri :ca ( New Yor k!
1
11

Alf red A. Knopf,

19/+0}, p . 107.

.

,

>

•
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expressed

a common feeling

so long as the United

v en he obse r ved th at

cqnt i nues to maintain a
prospe ct of
collision
betwe en those soldiers
/and the Japanes~
is
very evident ••••
The time hns come Nhen our
Govern~ent _should withdr~!
that regiment from China
and brin
it home ••••

r egiment

St ates

s [ i n China_J the

of soldier

0

In the House of Represent at ives , Hamilton Fi sh , one of th e
leadin,o, isol
that

tionists

, echoed this

"now is the ti me •••

[our/

sentiment

to withdraw

gunboats , and to give up voluntari

torial

when he ur ged

our armed for ces ,
l y our extrate r ri -

ri ght s. "22The administration

was f or ced to a cc ede to this

clamor f or withd rawal to th e extent

of dec laring

that

all

Americans who chose to rem ain in China af ter

repeatP d

w rni ng s to

Moreover , on

September

l e ve did

so at their

ll1-, 1937 , President

hen ceforth

Rooseve l t announced

th t

no government - owned vesse l would b e permi tted

to

muniti ons to China or Ja pan and th t any private

carry
vessels

did so at their

the govern ment persisted
insisten

m·m risk . 23
in its

c e of Americ n rights
Even the

the

o~m risk ,

sinking

On the •;rhole ~ however,

pol i cy of firm but cautious
and interests

of the

in China , 24

AILerican gunb o.:it Panay by

Ja pan e se on December 12 , 1937, did not lead

popular

Se s s .,

outcry

for war ,

Instead

there

to any

were even mor e

Zlu. s .,

Congressional
Record , 75th Cong ,, 1st
1937~ LXXX
I , ·art 7, 8178,

2 3Buell , p . 107 .
22 Ibid . p . 8157 .
1
24-Taylor , Foreign Polic;_y R_eRorts, XIII ( Febru ary
15 ; 1938) , 2$3 .

,_
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caustic

demands that

the United States

get its

and :i.ts nava l cr af t out of the theater
Congress man expressed

th:l -s at~itud

citizens

of war .2.5 One
succintly

~ quite

when h e

remarked . t ha t' ttif the Ameri can. gunboat
Pana_y
had been at
.
_,..
'

home, it would not have been bombed .tt2 6

The pos si bility

that

in a i,\rar with

Japan

involved

American commercial

the Unit ed 'St tes

in Chi na was re pugnant to in-,
th e gunb oat pan9y had

The fa ct that

been eseortt ng th re e St anda rd Oil vessels
th e attack

that

did not escape notice.

Americ an offi c ials

t.tworth

It was beyond contempt

were willing

of American

commercial

invo lvin g t his

to ri$k

interests

when he resolved

fo llo w the Am-eriean dollar

that
around

25char le s H. Smith, Public

Oiew Yor k :

Pr en t ice Hall;

26 u.

s.,

in China was not

an d pay for. r,2g

R. Reynolds of North Carolina

colleagues

war ,.'Z7 The pro.

na t io n of 1.30, 000 ,000 soul s in a war

t hey wi,11 be cal led upon to fight

Robert

at t h.e t i me or-

tr ade and a f~w doll ars in profits,ff

ttfor a little

tection

be come

ov er the destru c ti.o n of

interests

numer ble Congressmen .

might

Inc.,

Senator

sp oke for many of his

"we are not going to
t he world

Opinion in a Democracx
1942} , P • 518. 1

~Ccnc;res sio na l Reco r d, 7 5t h Cong ..,~ 3rd

Ses s ., 1938, LXXXIII, Pa.rt 9, 92.
27 Ib:td • ,

p ~ 113.

28U1os. , Congre ssiona l Re-cor d , 75t h Co

Sess.,

1937, LXXXYI,

Sess.,

29uMs., Congressional
Record,
1938, LXXXIII, Part I, 90.

Pa rt

it." 29

to protect

3, 6I I.

g . , 2nd

75th Cong.,

3rd
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Eff orts

were renewe d and intensified

Panay incident

to compel the Adrrdnistration

Anterica.n nationals,
the m, from the

w~rnings

that

m rines

natl the troops

\>rar zone s in

China.

if the Unit ed States

~-nd its

incidents

t·muld

gunb oats
surely

occur.

an effort

the

This

us a ,a inst

fear

the

There

suspicion

that

as it

mul gation
reasons,

their

it

rre;mr British

best

of the Open :Ooor.32

fellow

majority

eitizens,

in

·rhic h

brothers

to i nv olve us over

woul d become involved
investments

was cautioned,

ha d been on the · occasion

the vast

that

in

. must not

paw of Great Brita inti in the tar

again become t he treat's
East

guarantee

was a cco mpa..11iedby the

Stct tes,

of

further

or vice

the United States

Thfl United

was a plethora

f a iled, to get its

in pr otecti ng Great Br itai n 's extensive
Asia.31

prote ctil'¼g

blown up by the Chinese

seaa" were »doing their

in Ghinatt so that

and ships

Japanese,

so me Congre ss men entertained
across

to withdraw

Wo one could
0

to incite

the

out of Chin ese territory,

American gunboats would not be

versa .n30

after

of the

official

pro~

For: whatever vari ety of

of Congressmen,

to gether

with

rea ched the same concl usion:

Ame:t"i
cans must be evacuated from. China. and £or all those
Sese-,

30u. s ., Oo:ngres_$lonal Record , 7 5th Cong. , 3rd
193S 1 LXXXI!I, Part l, 863.

3lu~ s.,

Congressional
2 -,

19371 LXXXII J Part
.32y_

Sess.,

1938,

Rec ord,

1357.

75th Gong .,

fxXx~ff~~;;f°3':1
75th Cong.,
2~'7f~rdt

2nd
3rd
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who remain , official

rotc ction

The administration
hold

t he treaty

onist

abroad .

"a cutely

, nonetheless

e public

1

of the

pe ople for withdrawal
could do little

pre:issures

li

of

aga inst

offi cia l protests

a fu -ture

there

ambitions

was the constant

the lives

of equal commer cial

in China provi ded the United

territorial

would draw the nation

States

Government

could hope to obstruct

~ At the

danger that

and properties

with the

re ckoning . 34

gua rantee

with the only means by whi ch it
Ja pa n's

fro m the Ameri can

Americans from China , and

The Open Door with its

opportunity

in China in the

of State , however , remain ed

more than file

Ja pan ese Government

to up -

at home and an intemper ··te anta g-

The Department

consciousr

, continued

of American cittzens

rights

fa c e of' a hostil

must -.be withdrai·m . 33

s me time , however ,

some incident

involving

of Americans might occur whi ch
into

war .

This precarious

situation

was the source

of considerable

min istration

American states men reco gnized with profound

misgiving

.
that

to pur sue an objective

the Unit ed States
insignific

apprehe nsion within

in foreign

Government was being

ant finan cial

interests

the ad-

policy ,

compel led to sus t ain

under the most haza r dou s

circ umstances .
Had there
terring

not existed

Ja pan , there

is

the lar ger obj ective

ample rea _son to beli eve that

govern ment would have been in clined
33Masla nd , The Pa cific
(Se ptembe r, 1942), 283 .

34Blum , I , 485.

of de-

to .follow the

Hi storical

Review, XI

th e
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suggestion
nation

that

all

in which,

after

all

in the fortunes

of business

St.ates

in China .

citizens

Roosev el t's

Cabinet

by several

pr esence

of r isk.

to the notion

~

g the

strenuously

entire

·nation

China.35

invest

officials

that

the

interests

in China

to a.."'lunreasonable

degree

opinion

to the idea of risking

of United States

Of like

L. Ickes.

war to protect

Garn er was of this

East for the sake of busin~ -ss,
contin gents

wi thin

of risking

Americans i'"Jith vested

Vi ce · President

obje-cted

operat ed by United

The opposi·t;ion

high administrative

of a fe

oubjectin

enterprises

ic interest

commerce was qui te clear • . It was stron gly

Sino-American

were

ar ,1as being

a ful l-sc ale

t

The American Government had no intrins

waged .

felt

be removed fr om China.--a

Americans

.

He

war in the Far

and he did not believe · that

troops

were justified

in

mind was Secr eta ry 0£ the Interio r Haro ld

!ekes r emarked that

money in f oreign

was "no compulsion

there

enterprises'"'

·nd. that

those

to

who did

so could not e.xpect the Ameri can Governlllent . tito sacrifice

tho ·sands of lives

and mi llions

attempt

investments.u36

to prote ct their

It see ms cl.ear,
cm

American

in working

ercial

then,

that

the a ctivities

in an

of the

interests

in China were n ot successful

any transformation

upon the s@ntiments of the

American publi c or upon the course
toward

of treasux·e

Japan.

The isolationist

of American policy

• i mpulse

the United Sta tes not only remained
J6 rckes,

among the

strong

after

P·• 209.

people
Japan's

of
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assault
Panav

upon China, but actnally
i ncident

istrat:::i.ve
over

the

in De.cember,

in

circles

1937.

i ntensified

after

''li thin

hi oP.'.
h admin-

was grave

there

Vashington

t ha t some incident

p os'"'ibility

ther e co uld be no retr i~at bec ause

which

vested

American

interests

financial

granted

concern

mi ght occur

from

of t h e presence

of

in China. . Only on the

broad groun ds of curbin g Ja pane se ex pansionism
necessity

th e

was the

of upholdin g the complex system of treaty

ri ghts wh:i.ch surro unded Americans and their

pro perties

in

China .
Commercial Interests

~ajor
American trade
proad

in Relation

to

Economic Fuctors
and investments

ed t he pro portions

which

be QP-in Iin g..
, of the · t wentieth

had · been

century,.37

in China never appredicted

The failure

at the

of

American 'inve stments in China to grow cannot be attrj_buted
to the lack of official
part

of United

sulted

States

·protection

and encoura gement on th e

Government of f ici als.

in lar g e part. fro m the political

wardness

of China which made the nation

American

ca p ital.3

very ske ptical
remained

6

of China's

371,asland,
ber , 1942) , 282~

183 .

unattractive

pote ntialities.

impossi ble f or the impoverished

gro ps foresaw

r e--

it

and economic ba ck-

41oreover , the American

much in the way of imports
mercial

Rather

fro m the United

to

businessman

was

As lon g as it
Chinese to absorb
States , few com-

the develo pment of the Sino - American

The _Pa cific

381ockwood, Far Eastern

Historicd.l

Review,

XI ( Septem-

~urvey, V (August 12 , 1936 ),.
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Commercial

interco

ur::ie \-1:i.th Ja 1an, howev er _, ha d

ov er t he yea rs.

grown -ste adily

J a an ' s tr ade w:i.th t he United

with

China .

,-,as nearly

By 1920 the

five

to the political

At t he t urn of' t he century,
,..,t c t

es alrea

y excEF·d ed that

va l u e of' Americ an sn les

times that

of sales

to China .

to Japa~

In contr a st

and econo mic chaos 1hich haunte d Ghina, the

Ja p • nes e isl an ds were

the adaptation

the

mod el

of civ •il

of wester n i ndustrial

tranquility,

and

technolo gy had trans-

formed t he old Her mit Kingdom into a modern nation,40

Ame1"i
can businessmen
contacts
their

with

Ja.pan.

The Japanese

obli gations

financial

were pro mpt in meeting

to Americ a n ex p ort ers and the

from ,Japan ke pt up to quality

goodc:, imp orted
general

were usual ly well ple as ed wi th thei~

feeling

of good will

up between the commercial
By t h e mid-'t

and mutual

2.5 per cent,

h irties,

ti me, American

had gr own

J apa n was of f ar gre at er

sha re of America's

while

respect

A

gr oups in both countrie s . 41

economic i mport an ce to the United States
I n 1936 , China's

st andar ds.

Japan's

t han was China.42

fore:1.gn tr ade wa.s only

·was 7.7 per ce nt.

bu sines s i nves t ments

in Japan

At the

same

( ·•21 8 , 000, 000)

were considera bly more extens i ve than those in Chi na
39}ilasl an d, Th e Pa c:j_fj_c Historic
( Septe mb er, 19l1-2}, .t..93.

al Review,

XI

40Neumann, p . 136.,
41Mc:,
sland,
The Paci f ic _Historic a l .Review, XI
(Septe mber, 1942), 293.
42flar ley, Far Ea$tern 0urvey; V (July 29, 1936); 170.
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proportion
business

of American
with

all

e

orting

or several

Ja pan was both the best
su pp ly.

''lhen the

facts

with

f irst

of the

·-· s t Asian

commandL_ ~ role

the

did n ot work to the

community

whole of Asia

was small.

1937, exports

fro m t he United States

erably

in China ..

In the

years

more than

commer c ial

i·

10 pe r cent

American

it

th a t no acute problem of economic instability
In the

con "'id-

out 1ut.

be lli g erents

la p sed --s a conse qu ence of the hostilities,

States . 45

prior . to

of tota l

a ccounte d for

it h eith er or both

cre a ted for the United

J t a:tes in the

to both China and

tra de, ttrhich in turn

relations

ad vantage

Jn the

i m ed.L-3tely

than 10 per cent of total

less

sour ce of

in 1937, the

place , the eco nomic st ake of t.q.e Upited

Japan amounted to little

excess

of

'i

In 1936,

204,G00,ooo,

cmnmodities

were marketed

43'raylor

15, 19JS}~ 278. ' .
44Masland,

September,
the

11 oreign

Ameri c an s a les

while

011ly

second pl ace ,

'rhe P:acific

1911--2),2b3-o4.

Historical

States

to Ja pan ·were in
in American

In terms

Poli ey Re ports,

col-

would be

46,800,000

in China.46

I.f

was clear

Japan was more v luabl e to the co mmer ce of the United
th an l·rn.s China.

,

in America's

war erupted

trade

commercial

Ameri can export

-cou ntries

East~44

Far

Sino-Japanese

of t h e 'l"ast Asian

of the American

and i mport in g fir ms doing

cust omer and the chief

Such was Ja pan's

econo mic rel at ions

to sFy t ha t among a L,,lrge

it

Suffice

XIII

of s p ecific
( Fe bruary

Review,

XI

.

11
45willia m W. Lockwood, .Jr.,
Ameri can Neut-rality
and
Far IlJas t," Far Ea s tern Survey, VI {September 15, 1937}, 213.
46 Ibid.

-
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items . China's
was only

consumpti on of refined

one-fourth

that

in 19,36

oil products

amo1mt absorbed

by

Japa.n . 47

1935 , moreover , t he China tr ad e in American cotton
gave the United

the commodity thnt
tra ding stake

in East Asia,

St ates its

had virtu ally

After

goods ,

lar gest

disappeared

,

whil e Japan had become the mar ket for one.fourt h of all the
South's
exported cotton . 4 8 Generously
approximated , Ch ina
represented
States'

sli ghtly

foreign

more than 1 per cent of the United

trade .

t rom any angle , China's

place

in

the Am-erican economy was smal1 . 49
Thus the economic realities
mercial

rel a tions

failed

States

United

policy

he robbed of the argument that
link

in China for a more

against

Japan . -Not only v1as

his trade

was an important

in America ts economi c chain , but he was also

t ed with

other

co mmerci a l gr oups which

Ja pan of fa1" greater

nation's

anxious

welfare ..

com-

to gi•1re added weigh t to the

deroa.nds of the American businessman
forceful

of Asian-American

irnpor"tance to their

eonsidered

with Japan , an d locked with disfavor

·trade

·with

own and to th e

As mi ght be expe cted ,. these

to maint ain and expand their

confron ...

were

groups

econo mic rel ations
upon any action

-----------·-------------------4?Walter A~ Radius , ''The Play of Petroleum Forces
in the Far East°
193 ) , 208.
'
46William
United

Far Eastern Survex VII (September
.
.
- ~

w.

Sta t es Cotton

18; 1938) , 115.

7,

Lockwood, Jr ., " North China and the
Survey, VII ( ay

Trade , rt Far _Eastern

49uwhatts Our Stake in China?" , Business
August 7 , 1937 ., P • 15.

Week ,
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which m..ight i mpair t his trade .,50
of opinion

in th e United

possibility
little

community

faced with

Stat es 1-!hic h was hostile

of be coming involved

trade

Already

and a few dolla rs,

in a foreign
tr

in China was confronted

sheet

t ha t made one point

trade

w· s of no vital

to the

war "for

a

t he American busine ss

with

inescapably

importance

a body

a fina ncial
clear:

balance

the China

to the United

States.

Aside from t he i nsi gni fi canc e of the China trade
the

econo my of th e United

vest ments

States

a:s a

1. hole

eeonomic

relations

still

ere
holding s i n China '&'

rations

located

only a small

The petroleum

f urther.
the

industryt

with the largest

stake

fraction

to the

busine ss in China · con..-

.for example,

the industrial

produ ction

American investments

onl y abo ut 3.9 per cent of the total
Int ern ati onal Telephone

grou p
no more

in refi ned

else where

as one of

in China.

operating

the

supplied
revenues

of

and Tel egraph , the paren t or gani~

In brief , none of the l arger

investme nts

incom es .

.>1ho
le of East Asia. 51 Si mil arly,

the most val uable

with

total

in the Far East , ex ported

Shan gha i Tele ph one Company _, mentioned

zation.

The reve nues which

of their

than about 2 per cent of domestic
products

of American

of lar g e cor po--

subsidiaries

from their

features

of Sino-American

The bulk

in the United Sta tes.

t hese companies derived
stituted

, Americ an in-

in China were marked by sever al special

whic h served to diminis h the i mportance

to

American

i,n China was in a position

5 :tasl a.nd, The Pac ific Histori
(Se ptember, 1942~, 285.
51Farley, Far Eastern Survei,

cal

companies

to suffe r more
Revie\'l,

XI

V {July 29, 1936 ), 167.
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than minor

loss

of inco me as a rasult

conflict.

In addition

, pro perty damage in almost

case was co ver ed by insuranc

their

China trade

of the Si no...Japanese

e.

curt a iled,

~lhi le dis tressed

the i mmense size

por aticn s allo wed them to absorb t his loss
threat

to their

over -al l financial

every
to see

of these

without

cor ...

any

poeition.52

The out break of var in China was al so the occasion
for the American
degree

of resilience

The petrolellil
fining

businessman

dominated

of which h eh

industry,

and marketing
areas

gradu ally
phases

eliminated

in the -etherlands

Phi li ppines,

At the

Indies,

tie

sold in great

same time,

American oil

of petroleum

Br itis h Malaya,

too,

ao proach to the unfavorabl

China by the disru ptions

was ruined

its

the

and else wher e. 53

war had brou "ht to one o.f its

the industry

by shifting

which it

The American to ba cco indu stry,
same reali

in Ja panese-

recovered

develo pment, and distribution

products

fro m the re-

pat e more ext en sivel y in the ex-

began to pa rtici

ploitation,

s always been ca pab le.

of crude oil

to th e Japanese .

comnanies

the remarkable

of t h e industry

of China , quickly

emphasi s to t he field
.uanti ties
r

to demonstrate

whi ch all

an nounced that
"for

best

the duration

dis pla yed this

e conditions

Forced out of

markets .
war s bring

to commerce,

the "tre mendo us Chinese
of th e war,."

whi ch

market'r

The toba cco

52 "Little
in China,n
Threat to U. S . Investments
The Fina,.ncial World, LXVIII (September 1, 1937) , 8.
53Radiu s, Far Eas tern
1938 }, 206-11.

Surve :y; VII

(Se ptemb er 7,
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exporters,
Central

however,

g· ve notice

th at they had turned

and South Americ a where th ey planned to r etriev e

some of the losses

suf f ered elsewhere.54

Th e impulse
Americ an people

for peace which was so strong

durin g the mid-'thirties

leading

exp ort

journal

The edito r of a

amazed to hear

ex port

see their

trade

'isolationism,•
Chronicle ,

than

exeeuti ves

is a poli cy whose wisdo m is enforced by th e ob-

situation.rt56

same journal

States

edit oria.lize.d
of this

with the politics

These opi nions were to persist
community

Worl d War II.

On another

that

country

mix ed up in any way with

tan gled at any point

th at three

war . tt55 "America n

11

this

business

would rath~r

u said the Commercial _ and · 1nancial

in 1919 do the people

United

i,const a ntly

say t h at . they

st opp ed t han to risk

f a cts of the world

casion,

he wap

r€ marked that

among the

pcn~tr ated the

thi nkin g of com.merci a.l circ l es a.e well.

vious

to

oc-

nno more now

want to see th e

th e Lea ue or enof Euro pe or Asi a, tt57

a mong the members of th e

throu ghout the dec ade which prec eded

A survey conducte d as l ate a s 1940 reveal ed

out of four busines s exe cutives

54,"Worl d Unrest

1" ·

United

CXXIX (March 26, 193$), p ••
55ftThe Editor

States

in the United

Tobaec o Journal,

Thin ks Out Loud , 11 ~mer ic an Ex-oorter,

CXX (Febru ary , 1937), P~ 32

56 nconeernin u Americ a n

1 Iso

l ationis

·,, n, Cooone.x:c
i al

and Finan ci al Chrqn :lcle , CVL (Octo ber 16, 1937),
Financial

p . 2451.

57n It .Ching to Take a Hand," Commercial and
Chronicle,
CXLVI (June 11, 1938), p. 3718.
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States

still

letting

favored

nature

either

take

its

The apparent

a ppeasement of the Japane se or

course.58

failure

of the American bu si nessman in

China to win the sympathy and support
groups within

his

the United

lack of success

Japan.

with the attitudes

men any ·1here sa nctioned

action

genera lly
While

Japan's

on "'business

to look with

c policies,

predisposed

upon any sug gestion

disfavor

business ...

i'ew American

milit aristi

as usualn

were

held by the

the

the major.
of strong

which might pr ovok e war between the United
This view was held by the business

and Japan .

to

int ere st s in

measure s aga in st the Japanese

comn1erci al community at home .

ity

contributed

which prompted financial

China to demand firmer

urge to carry

undoubtedly

in influen cin g American poli cy toward

1'he motives

not compatible

States

of the cow.m
ercial

States

community at

large.59
In the fi nal analysis

econo mic
mercial

nd

olitic

, a combina tion

1 factors

of both

pre-vented the American

com-

community in China from exertin g any apprec i abl e

egree of influence

over United

States

policy

toward Ja pan.

It was not because

of success J.ul agitation

by

groups with vested

interests

Americ an diplo-

macy came to the defense

i n China that

of the Open Door.

American states-

men were not concerne d with the f a te of a trade

ship whi ch had never

developed

commercial

relat,ion-

beyond the embryonic

5gFortune, X.XII {September, 1940), P• 73.
59Masland, The Pacific Histori ca l Review, XI

(Se tember,

1942 ), 285,

.

stage.
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They were concerned,
perialism
Pacific

howev~r , with thwarting

which threatened
.

the balance

If Japan should go unhindered

rush for empire,

the security

the Fa:r East would ultimately

deter

Ja pan that

mercia l interests

in China,

Japanes e im-

of power in the
in its

head -lo ng

of American possessions
be threatened~

the United States

and not becaus~ of any intrinsi

-

supported

c regard

in

It was to

the Open Door-,

for American com..
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CHAPTERV

SUM
MARYANDCONCLU
SION
of American commercial relations

The history

China is a long and complex one, dating
d~ys of the American Republie .
States

with the promulg ation

diplomatic

notes,

istrati

that

declaration

American foreign
United Stat~s

for

res p ect

ve integrity

its

poli cy.

of

equa.lit.y within

of the Uni.ted Sta'tes.l

had eome the additiona
China 's territorial

was also now an official

into

zen:i.th

Jith Hay 's famous series

interest"

Chi.na; became a "positive

notmcement

reached

the conce pt of commercial

Acco mpan:v.ing this

of the United

of the Open Door Poli cy by Secretary

John Hay in 1900.

of State

from the earliest

The interest

Government in the China trade

with

and admin--

part

This marked the entrance

the political

l pro ...

entanglements

of
of the

of East

Asia,.2

Such an abrupt

departure

concern tor only hemis1heric
any realirrtic

. appraisal

from America's

politi

cs was not followed

of 1.,1ha
t must be q_one if

power was to be brou ght into balan ce with this
ient

United

in national

States

policy.

In the

traditiona

;..e-ars which

Government made, no effort

by

national

new in gr edfollowed,

to :provide

the

for the

l
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adequate

defense

of the Open Door.3

Open Door was., then,

a virtual

The doctrine

.dead letter

of the

from its

in-

ception.
The American people

evinced

no greater

for the Open Door in China than did their
area

so far removed from the United

little

related

arousing

any su~tained

iasm was re f lected
majority

by government

efforts

investments

officials

in China,5

economic stake

so

of

This same lack of enthus-

indifferent

of Americ an businessmen

An

and seemingly

was incapable

intere st . 4

by the

government.

States

to domesti c security

enthusia sm

attitude

which the

dis played toward periodi c
to interest

them in direct

As a cons-equence, America's

in China re mained insignificant

down through

the years.,

Ja pan 's conquest of' Manchuria in 1931-.19.32 and its
even more alarming
sharply

assault

upon Chin a proper

challen ged the two fundamental

Open Poor.

'l'he question

of engaging

Japanese

Empir e in order

privilege

s in China, or to preserve

rity

. tained

had ever believed
this

States

that

the territorial

integ ...

Government.

No administrati

on

the Open Door was worth a war , and

3osgood, p. 79.
1

in war with the

was n€ver seriou sly enter-

judgement had been sustained

5 uigley

princi ple s of the

to safe guard Americ an commercial

of the Chinese Republic,
by the United

in 1937

p . 36,

by American public
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opin ion.6
In 1937, however , American
so:methin.g more was imrol ved than
doctrine

that

to either

had . never

Asia,

the mere violation

Japanese

the delicate

as on the mareh in

i mperia lism

events

Japan might

of power in the Pacific.,

balance

Americ an Gover~ent

value

or economic wel l-bein g of the

If allowed to procee d unhindered,

destroy

of a

been cons.i de-red of intrineie

the political

United Stat es.

st a:tesmen sens ed that

came to realize

in China must be integrated

The

pol icy towar-d

th at its

1n th a foreign

towax-d t he world as a whol e in the interest

policy

of prev enting

world--wide aggres sion.?

lar ger objecti ve in mind that

It had been with this
Secretary
Garner

of Sta te
in 1937 that

the Sino-Japanese
th@ value
ments

American
the

nify

interest

·trade

with

it transcends

in the

to the Japanese

face

6osgood~ lh 62.
Gri s"rold, p • 469 .

State •s in

in i mportanae

de parture

of da.nger

cou ld only
by the

Such encouragement
S.ee also

invest•

• • • welfare

A scuttling

a complete retreat

.:>tates from the Pacifie~9

United

resident

China or American

even the

in China . tt8

mainland

of the

nrar trans-cends

conflict

citizens

Asian

the

of' American

in China;

Hul l wrote to Vice-

Cordell

of
from
sig-

United
must not be

Neu:-mann.p , 148,. and

. 7 cnou I-kua,
tt'fne American Pol.icy in China, 1929 ...
19.39n (unpu bl ished Ph.D. dissertation,
Fletcher
School of
Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University,
1949), p. J.

8Hull,

I,

567.

9Blum, I, 480.
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giv en to those
cesses

relationships.ulO

The decision

had thus been reached

in China noisily
measures

American citizens

demanded th at the United States

countrymen half

.fellow

quite

dif fe rent.

own people,

i n the

Great

An intense

1

isolationist

the

ea rly

pa tion

a

Sta tes

a firm

in the qu arre .ls

sentiment,

by

of the United States

war had elicited

against

of the Americ a n mind,

had been rejected

had co me to b e profoundly

cj_tiz en s of the United

was

ment to the American homeland..

ar itself

revulsion

oJ:

af ter World War I had brought

and the partici

bE!-come involved

away , ho:i,
,rever)

League of Nations

Wilson's

t a ke

The disposition

a world

The years

deep sense of d isillusion
Pr~sident

of meth od partic ...

with an econo mic stake

to stop the Japanese...

their

his

Conditions

to the moment made the question
dif f icult._

pro ...

Japan's

that

Asia must be thwarted.

in East

peculiar

strong

for "orderly

in international

ambitions

ularly

who showed open disdain

fro m the

resolve

of foreign

never

again

t ·o

po1.,.re:rs. ·The

never too far beneath
had be en excited

regretted.

the surf ace

to new hei ghts

in

and , j_d- 1 t hirt ies•

This national

deter min at ion to avoid

imposed sev ere li mitations

with conducting

the f orei gn af fa irs

the ti me of Ja pan's
might jeopardize

1.iho were entrusted

of' the United

inv a sion of' China.

the pea ce and tr anquillty

woul d not be tolerated
.

10Hull,

uuon those

.

r.

567.

by the

f'o.re .ign wars

States

Any action

at

which

of' the nation

American people.

After

much

10
of min d s, United

-se.a.rc-hing

to c0-nclude that

St.ates

offieials

the only visible

means of restraining

Japan seemed to rest

in a vigorous

ri ghts

in China.

ture

and interests

defense

of American
fe.eble

Yet .even this

was subje ·ct to stron
g criticis
I

1937 and 193$, there

Throu ghout

had been forced

m in 'the United

were continuous

Admi nistration,
this

who chose

of f icial

to re mai n .• · The ti.oost:ivelt

ho wev er-, persistently

one means at its

States .

demt;n:ds to

ree all all Am.ericans fro m China and to withdraw
pr o·t;ecti on fro m those

gea-

r efu sed to surrender

t1is posal by which it ho ped to

restra1,.n Ja pan,,.
The deci s ion to i nvoke the :principles
Door h ad not resulted
material

interests

The motives
not

c;i.f the

economic.

from any desire

to

su pp ort

of A."nerican co mmercial

groups

goverri ment

had been

There was nothing

Americ an business

interests

national

'l1he occasion

pol icy.

of the Op-en
the
in China.

stric ·t ,ly poi:ttic

ne w in this

the

1

use of

in China as an instrument
for

al

of

form a l announcem ent

of. the Open Door in 1900 hatl been the impendin g dis ember•
m~nt of Ghina., an eve :nt which
had hoped to prev ent. .

considerations
objective

financial

In .so far

of State

was to secure

.a political
War

sou ght to interest

Jol, n Hay

as Hay thou ght of economic

at all , he ha d tr ade in mind,

bet ween 1900 a.nd ·lorld
had both

Secretary

result

I, Se cr etarie-s

. 11

but his main
I n the years

Knox and Lansing

Americ a n business men in various

sehe mes in China for

the political

purpose

of

l
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counter ba lancin g Rus sian and Japanese
M nahuria

and China.12

influence

Thus i-then the United

in

St ate s

Government used the Open Door as a pol i tic a l weapon aga inst
Ja nane se i n 1937, it

the

long historic-

-~--ra.
~ on ly fo llo wing a

p:reeedent.
A study of United

poliey

1937 and 19.3$ cl ea rly refutes

during
American

commercial

ci ab le influence
it

States

interests

States

of St a te,

fre quently

econo J.ic activ ities

whic h

J apan's

eff orts

1
·

to ok ste ps to discourage

i ght benef it

50;000,0 00 in credits

Japanese

fro m private

earl y in 1938 , Washin gto n quic kly let

th a t it

di d not approve any such credits,,
dro np ed.1.3

sources

Japanese

for indirect

areas

of North
that

l)"Sino

Ameriean
be known

and t he matter

occasion,

Western

several

China.
it

i nves t ments in the subjugated

Again th e United 0tate-s Govern ment

wou ld look wit h di sfa vor up on th e

.

Chronicle,

it

at.temp-

b.j.nted t hat t h ere •wo· u ld be many opportun-

i tie$

indicated

On another

imper-

interests

sources

was irrJin-ediately

to cre ate

The Dep art ment

en cert ain Japane s e in dustrial

ted to secure

contrary,

Government usec the

ty" $phe:1:~ein the .Far East!

oreov er,

iali.sm.

To the

wit hi n China f or the

interests

pur pose of obs tr uc ting

a u eo-prosperi

the clai m that

:relations ...

i s a paren t t hat the United

political

evolved

in Chin a exe rted any appre-

upon foreign

pr esence of business

as it

...Ja.panes -e War,. n · Q9mrnerc:b !S·l

CXLVIII (J anuary 22, 193~),483.

.
c

nd Fina.nci ,~
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provision

of American cap ital

in halt i ng the shipment

aerial
Hull

bombs to Japan .
re minded all

of-American

In Ju ly,

equipment t hat tho United Sta tes
of airplane

whi ch bombed civilian

aircraft

1938 , Secretary

Ameri can manufacturers

opposed to the sale

of exploit in g a

The Stat e Departmen t was als o suc-

conquer ed territory.14
cessful

for purposes

of aeronautical

s and equipment

to nations

Although Japan was not

mentione d by name, Washin gton noted with satisfa

craft

and aerial

Commercial
against

for export

groups in the Uni t ed State s often

nevertheless

upon their

were willing

to accept

ction

licenses

bombs to Japan had disappeared

such li mitations

of St ate

Government was stro ngly

popu lations~

by November, 193$, a ppli c ations

and

activities

that
of air-

.15

complained
, but they

the jud gement of their

'

government without
While
tailored

to fit

in China. , there
did influence
relations

.

;::,._
__
against
cr aft

the desires

policy

.1 6

toward Ja pan was never

of American business

is a sense i n i·?hich these
the su bsequen t course

interests

commercial

on, resentment

to bomb cro wded Chin ese cities,

Japanese

air-

killing

The war whic h Ja pan had begu..'1 demolished

ll1-stewar t,
235 .

Far Eas tern

Survey,

VII ( Octob er 12-,

15nsino-Ja panese War," Commerci al , nd Financial
CXLV
III {Jan uary 14, 1939) ~ 164-65, ·
16Masland, The Pacific His torical
Review, XI
(September, 1942) , 289.
·

Chronicle,

groups

of Japanese- American

As t he war in China dragged

continued

t

Unit ed States

~esistence

Japan mounted in the United St ates .

thousa .nd s.

1938)

any serious
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American churc hes and schools,
and destroyed

Ameri can lives

for Ameri can interests
gradl;le .lly

angered

ruined

•.' . he brutality

the

strong

1938 , the United

people

stand

Unit .ed States.l7

of the

made poss i ble an

$25 , 000,000

Nationalist

China .

chase ,s of essential
treasury

in credits

This enabled

the Chinese-Americ.:-.m mone tary

9, 1937, by- whieh China was able ·to

exchan ge aga inst

gold reserves

·These were the firs t positive

since

the Japanese

its

the

summer of the

followin

the

Unit ed States

was abr ogating

to the

in six month's

hostility
17 Feis ,

National

ist

g year

to China was fol lo wed tn
by the

its

a

ouncement

1911 co mJn
ercial

Formal noti ce th at the treaty

26 , 1939.

Tokyo's

aids

in New

:i.nvasion~1$

. 'rh is mate ri a l assistance

July

of

war mater i als ., ln addi tio n , the

York.

minated

of

China to make vit al pur~

dollar

with Japan .

with

at the disposal

obtain

Government

concerned

the outward appe arance

extended

or July

agreement

By the end of

Japan.

On Dece mber 15, the Unit ed ·St ates- Export ....Import

.

Bank plaeed

Arneriean

against

State s was no longer

seru pul ously maintaining
neut:t·ality

and dis re gard

whi ch the Japan-as ....exhibited

Growing popular- indi gnation
increasingly

American businesses,

that
treaty

would be ter-

ti me was given to the Japan-ese

I1:1t he j.udg ement of t he State

to American i ntere sts

011

D·epartme:nt~

in China did not

• ·18.

l 8nu., • Counters Japants New Order in Asia , "
J:oreign Polic y.Bul l etin, XVII! (De~ember 30, 1938}, 1.

112

merit

the

continuance

and Jupan,19

between the United States
that

President

Roosevelt

te mpla tin g for

and Se cr etary

have · been out of the question

cli mate

Thus,

while

St ates'

th e i ni tial

pr ot -ests

res ponse to Ja pan's

publie.

~lapan stiffened

g i ven increased

:imperialis

bus-

of the

challen ge, the repeated

in China by a callous
of Amet'icans

, the gov ern men t in Wash i ng,-eon was

latitude

in its

m in East Asia.

effort ·s to det er Japanese

Interf erence with American
did , t hen , have an ultimate

upon Americ an poli cy,, not as a pri me mover, but as

one among a gro wi ng number o.f grievance$
States

of American

the formation

And as the attitud€

ri ghts in Chi na by the Japanese

effect

but which

did su ccee d in wor king a chang e upon the mind of

the American
toward

woul d

opinio n .

destru ction of American interests
ag gressor

that

be cause of the changin g

iness men in China did not influence
United

Hull had been con-

t wo years before,

in l arge part

in American public

arrangement

This was a step

It was a measure

some ti me.20

now be came possible

co.rr..me
rcial

of a s pe cial

came to harbor

l9 Hull,

aga inst

I, 636-J7.

Japan.,

whi ch the United
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